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A Reexamination of the NonDischargeability of Criminal Restitutive
Obligations in Chapter 13
Bankruptcies
by
ANN HABERFELDE*

The bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders ....I

I. Introduction
Criminal restitution, as an obligation to pay money, looks like a

debt. Yet the non-dischargeability of criminal restitutive obligations in
bankruptcy presents a conflict between the principles of bankruptcy
law-to give "honest" debtors a "fresh start" by discharging their
debts-and the criminal justice system's goals of punishment and reha-

bilitation. 2 Restitution, with civil origins in contract law, is now commonly used in criminal law as a form of punishment for non-violent

crimes. 3 While contract restitution attempts to make the plaintiff whole
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1977, University of California, Berkeley.
1. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 342-43 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837. Justice Blackmun has noted that "there is no suggestion in the
Bankruptcy Code that it may used as a shield to protect a criminal from punishment for his
crime." Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, the Supreme Court recognized that
[o]ne of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from
the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."... [The
Bankruptcy Act] gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor.., a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S.
549, 554-55 (1915)).
In Kelly v.Robinson, the Court noted "the difficulties the courts will have in coordinating
the Bankruptcy Code with state criminal restitution statutes." 479 U.S. 36, 59 n.6 (1986).
3. Bruce R. Jacob, Reparation or Restitution by the Criminal Offender to His Victim:
Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern CorrectionalProcess, 61 J. CRINI. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 152, 155-56 (1970) ("Reparation by the offender to the victim is required by criminal courts today chiefly in cases involving property crimes and principally in
[1517]
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by returning her to the position she occupied prior to the defendant's
breach, 4 criminal restitution not only attempts to make the victim whole,
but also seeks to punish the defendant. Criminal restitution thus adds to
the civil overtones of victim compensation the further explicit goals of
rehabilitation and punishment.5 Restitution has proved to be an effective
penal sanction: it vindicates the public's desire to obtain justice, 6 reduces
crowding in prisons by allowing petty criminals to maintain their liberty, 7 and furthers rehabilitative aims by making the criminal "pay" for
her crime.8
connection with the use of the suspended sentence or probation."). Jacob notes a more practical reason as well: "[S]ince perpetrators of violent crimes are typically poor or financially
destitute, a judgment against such offenders would be uncollectible." Id. at 152 (footnote
omitted). See also Note, Victim Restitution in the CriminalProcess: A ProceduralAnalysis, 97
HARV. L. REV. 931, 933 (1984) ("[Restitution] is not an appropriate punishment for all
crimes.... [R]estitution alone is unlikely to be a sufficiently severe sanction for cases involving wealthy defendants or violent crimes, although it can still be effectively utilized in such
cases if combined with other criminal penalties.") (footnote omitted).
4. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.19, at 946-47 (2d ed. 1990). Restitution
as a remedy for breach of contract requires that the breaching party "account for a benefit that
has been conferred by the injured party." Id. at 946. Restitution as a contract remedy seeks
not to enforce the promise, but to prevent unjust enrichment. Id. at 947.
5. Criminal restitution as recompense to the victim is similar to contract restitution.
Under an economic analysis, contract law imposes no stigma on the breacher because of the
notion of "efficient breach." "Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy. The promisor may simply have discovered that his performance is worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his promise, provided he makes
good the promisee's actual losses." Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir.
1988) (Posner, J.). Punitive damages are inappropriate for breach of contract because "they
will encourage performance when breach would be socially more desirable." FARNSWORTH,
supra note 4, at 848; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 105-14 (3d
ed. 1986) (compelling performance wastes resources; remedy should be limited to simple damages). However, criminal restitution goes beyond recompense. Because of the stigma attached
to a criminal proceeding, and the fact that restitution may be tied to a suspended sentence or
probation, "a criminal conviction, unlike [a] civil judgment, carries with it the stigma, or
brand, of societal condemnation." Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve CriminalLaw Objectives: Understandingand Transcending the Criminal-Civil
Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1352 (1991). However, this is only one distinction
between contract and criminal restitution; and the line between civil and criminal sanctions is
unclear at best and subject to some debate. Id. at 1350-69. Criminal restitution clearly serves
purposes beyond that contemplated by contract law, since often restitution can exceed the
victim's loss and serves as a condition to probation. See infra Part III.
6. This serves an underlying purpose of preventing private retribution. Restitution "'is
emotionally felt as "compensation" for the public damage done.'" Note, supra note 3, at 936
(quoting Jerome Hall, Interrelationsof Criminal Law and Torts (pt.2), 43 COLUM. L. REV.
967, 971 (1943)).
7. Note, supra note 3, at 931-32.
8. Restitution allows the "offender... [to] express guilt in a socially acceptable manner
and ...
increase his self-respect by gaining a sense of accomplishment." By requiring the
offender to pay the victim directly, rather than requiring the offender to pay "the abstract,
impersonal state," restitution "impresses upon the offender his responsibility to others." This
furthers rehabilitation more effectively than fines. Note, supra note 3, at 938.
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The bankruptcy discharge exonerates the debtor of her future liability to pay existing claims. 9 This economic rehabilitation is designed to
promote the credit economy prevalent in the United States.10 In the case
of criminal restitution obligations, however, this goal of economic rehabilitation comes into conflict with the goals of criminal rehabilitation and

punishment.
Bankruptcy courts and eventually the United States Supreme Court
wrestled with the problem of debtors who sought to discharge in bankruptcy a criminal restitutive obligation that was a condition of probation." Bankruptcy courts either discharged restitutive obligations by
emphasizing their contract origins1 2 or found them non-dischargeable by
emphasizing restitution's punitive nature as criminal punishment, and
cited federalism concerns about bankruptcy court interference with state
court criminal judgments.1 3 In 1986, the Supreme Court directly con9. The bankruptcy discharge is codified in 11 U.S.C. § 727 for Chapter 7 proceedings,
11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988), and § 1328 for Chapter 13 proceedings, 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990). Chapter 7 proceedings are "liquidations" in which the debtor's non-exempt
assets are liquidated by the trustee to pay creditors. Chapter 13 debtors repay some or all of
their creditors through a repayment plan administered by a trustee. See infra Part II.C.2. The
discharge granted in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases relieves the debtor from prior financial
liabilities and enjoins creditors from making further collection efforts. See 11 U.S.C. § 524
(1988). By wiping the financial slate clean, the debtor obtains a "fresh start." The discharge
granted in Chapters 7 and 13 is discussed more fully infra in Part II.C.
10. "The primary function of the bankruptcy system is to continue the law-based orderliness of the open credit economy in the event of a debtor's inability or unwillingness generally
to pay his debts ... [by] rehabilitat[ing] debtors for continued and more value-productive
participation, ie., to provide a meaningful 'fresh start.'" REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.,
pt. 1, at 71 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
11. Compare Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) (criminal restitutive obligation nondischargeable in Chapter 7 case) with Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552 (1990) (criminal restitutive obligation dischargeable in Chapter 13 proceeding).
12. See, e.g., Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (criminal restitutive obligations are "debts" as
defined by Bankruptcy Code and therefore dischargeable); Multnomah County v. Price (In re
Price), 920 F.2d 562, 562 (9th Cir. 1990) (discharging restitutive obligation in Chapter 13 case,
following holding of Davenport without discussion); Cullens v. District Court (In re Cullens),
77 B.R. 825, 828 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (restitutive obligations dischargeable in Chapter 13
case because § 523(a)(7), which was applicable only to Chapter 7 cases, indicated congressional intent to confine non-dischargeability of restitutive obligations to Chapter 7 cases); In re
Vohs, 58 B.R. 323, 326 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (restitutive obligations dischargeable in Chapter 13 case where state's main goal in imposing restitution is to compensate victim).
13. See, e.g., Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53 (criminal restitutive obligation non-dischargeable because it fit within § 523(a)(7) exception to discharge for criminal fines, penalties and forfeitures); United States v. O'Connell (In re O'Connell), 80 B.R. 475, 476 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)
(restitution imposed to further penal and rehabilitative goals, not as compensation to victim;
therefore, not a debt dischargeable in Chapter 7 proceeding); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Oslager (In re Oslager), 46 B.R. 58, 61-62 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (court looked to state
law to determine intent of restitution and determined restitution was not dischargeable in
Chapter 7 proceeding based on federalism concerns and court's finding that restitution was not
a debtor/creditor relationship rooted in contract law, but a criminal sanction); Black Hawk
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fronted the issue in Kelly v. Robinson,14 a Chapter 7 liquidation case, and
found that criminal restitution could not properly be discharged in bankruptcy because restitution fit within the discharge exceptions for criminal
fines, penalties, and forfeitures. 15 However, the Kelly Court declined to
decide whether restitution was a "debt" within the meaning of the Bank-7
ruptcy Code, 16 and cited federalism as a further basis for its decision.1
Four years later the Court addressed the restitution dischargeability
problem in a Chapter 13 case. In Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare v. Davenport, 8 the Court distinguished Kelly and discharged the
debtor's restitutive obligations,19 finding that restitution was a debt under
the Bankruptcy Code. The Court's decision was further supported by
the discharge provisions of Chapter 13, which are more generous than
County v. Vik (In re Vik), 45 B.R. 64, 67, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (nature of restitution
such that its central focus is not payment to victim; therefore, not a debt dischargeable in
Chapter 7 proceeding); Pellegrino v. Division of Crim. Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42 B.R. 129,
134 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (although "debt" as defined in Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly include restitution, federalism and congressional policy require non-dischargeability in
Chapter 7 case); In re Button, 8 B.R. 692, 694 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (restitution imposed as
criminal punishment not dischargeable in Chapter 7 proceeding); see also Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Wright (In re Wright), 87 B.R. 1011, 1016 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988) (Kelly applies to
restitution imposed under federal law).
14. 479 U.S. 36 (1986). See infra Part V for a detailed discussion of the facts and issues
in the Kelly case.
15. 479 U.S. at 50. Section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge in a
Chapter 7 proceeding "a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit [that] is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)
(1988).
16. 479 U.S. at 50. "[WMe need not address [the] question... [of whether restitution is a
debt] because we hold that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal
court imposes as part of a criminal sentence." Id.
17. The Court stated:
Our interpretation of the [Bankruptcy] Code also must reflect... a deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal
proceedings. The right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important
aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly "the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions."
Id. at 47 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).
18. 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
19. Id. at 564. The Court noted that "it would be anomalous to construe 'debt' narrowly
so as to exclude criminal restitution orders." Id. at 562. Following an expansive construction
of debt, and the broad discharge provisions of Chapter 13, the Court concluded that "'[i]t is
preferable for debtors to attempt to pay such debts to the best of their abilities over three
years'" in a Chapter 13 plan. Id. at 563 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 1328.01[l][c]
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1986)). "[T]o construe 'debt' narrowly in this context [Chapter 13] would be to override the balance Congress struck in crafting the appropriate discharge
exceptions for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors." Id. The Court found it logical that Congress could have concluded "a debtor's interest in full and complete release of his obligations
outweighs society's interest in collecting or enforcing a restitution obligation outside the agreement reached in the Chapter 13 plan." Id. at 561.
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those governing Chapter 7.20 Congress immediately responded to the
Davenport decision by amending Bankruptcy Code § 1328, which governs Chapter 13 discharges, to specifically state that criminal restitutive
21
obligations are non-dischargeable in a Chapter 13 proceeding.
Is Congress' solution the best or only response to the criminal restitution dischargeability problem? This Note examines the policies promoted by bankruptcy discharge and criminal restitution. There is both
conflict and harmony inherent in the policies underlying the imposition
of restitution as a criminal punishment and the goals behind bankruptcy
discharge. Federalism and preemption issues also arise when restitution
and discharge confront one another in bankruptcy court. 22 A survey of
these policies and issues will demonstrate that the Davenport case was
correctly decided: criminal restitution should be considered a debt. An
examination of the discharge exceptions of the Bankruptcy Code, however, reveals some instances of a "conditional" type of discharge-one
which is based on the debtor's ability to pay. These more flexible discharge provisions suggest that an equitable alternative to Congress' rigid
approach to the problem is available. Using these "conditional" discharge provisions as examples, this Note proposes a solution in accord
with the broadly read discharge of Davenport-a solution which satisfies
both the concern that discharge abrogates the effectiveness of restitution
as a punishment and violates the doctrine of federal non-interference
with state criminal prosecutions, as well as the concern that the goals of
bankruptcy be fulfilled.
Bankruptcy discharge and criminal restitution share common goals,
and are more allies than rivals. Rehabilitation is sought by both bankruptcy law, through the discharge of debts, 23 and by criminal law,
20. See infra Part II.C.2.
21. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3103, 104 Stat. 4789, 4916.
The Act amended § 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code by adding subsection (3) to explicitly
except criminal restitutive obligations from discharge under Chapter 13. Id. The Criminal
Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865, 2865, also amended
§ 1328(a) in an identical manner. Section 1328(a) now reads, in part:
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan.., the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by
the plan ....

except any debt-

(3) for restitution included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.
The earlier of these amendments was enacted on November 15, 1990, and became effective
immediately. Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 4, 104 Stat. at 2865.
22. Both Kelly and Davenport specifically addressed the federalism problem, and Kelly's
finding of non-dischargeability was substantially based on federalism. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at
47-49. However, the discharge of criminal restitution should also trigger an analysis of preemption, because bankruptcy law is exclusively federal and displaces state insolvency laws.
See infra note 55 and Part IV.
23. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (Congress intended the fresh
start of bankruptcy to "include freedom from most kinds of pre-existing tort judgments.");
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through restitutive sentences. 24 Bankruptcy rehabilitation provides financial, psychological, and social benefits to the debtor, 25 enabling her to
resume participation in the credit economy without too much disruption
to either her income26 or property, 27 depending upon which chapter of
the Bankruptcy Code she elects. The scheme of this broad discharge,
which is not conditioned upon either the debtor's ability to repay debts 28
or the sanction of creditors, has evolved in response to the credit economy prevailing today, and is an integral part of our capitalistic system. 29
On the other hand, restitution rehabilitates the criminal by providing
psychological awareness through repayment of the wrong done to the
victim, 30 and allows the criminal to retain her liberty and thereby remain
a productive member of society. 3 1 Restitution is an effective sentencing
tool, and an integral part of our state criminal justice systems. 32 Thus,
both bankruptcy and criminal restitution aim to rehabilitate and sustain
functional actors within the bounds of our society and economy.
Criminal restitution, however, has a punitive aspect absent from
bankruptcy discharge. When granted on the criminal's conviction, restitution often is a condition of probation. 33 By making the criminal comLocal Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) ("[V]arious provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act were adopted in light of [the fresh start] and are to be construed.., in harmony with it so
as to effectuate the general purpose and policy of the Act.").
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1992); People v. Richards, 17 Cal.
3d 614, 619-20, 552 P.2d 97, 100-01, (1976); People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 356, 64
Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1967).
25. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the benefits of bankruptcy discharge.
26. In a Chapter 7, the debtor exchanges all non-exempt property for the discharge, keeping her future income. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988 & Supp. 111990). See infra Part II.C.1
for a discussion of the procedures and effect of a Chapter 7 case.
27. In the case of Chapter 13, the debtor is entitled to keep her property, exchanging this
retained possession for her future wages through the Chapter 13 plan. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 13011330 (1988 & Supp. 111990). See infra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of the procedures and effect
of a Chapter 13 plan.
28. A discharge which is not contingent on the debtor's ability to pay is "unconditional."
See infra Part II.D.3; Douglas G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional,and Suspended Dischargesin
Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 73 (1982).
29. See generally Charles G. Hallinan, The "'FreshStart" Policy in ConsumerBankruptcy:
A HistoricalInventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 65-67 (1986) (discussing theories of the role of bankruptcy discharge in economy and society).
30. Richard E. Laster, CriminalRestitution: A Survey of Its Past History and an Analysis
of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 71, 80-82 (1970). "A system of restitution...
serve[s] to keep the criminal-victim relationship alive long after the original offense so as to
impress upon the mind of the criminal that he has injured a human being, not some impersonal
entity known as the state." Id. at 80.
31. Id. at 81. "Custody conflicts with rehabilitation, if for no other reason than that the
former forces a [person] to adjust to a different 'normal' society. One benefit of... restitution
is that it ...keep[s] the criminal within the normal society ...." Id. (footnote omitted).
32. See infra Part III, notes 282-300 and statutes collected therein.
33. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-14-13(d)(8) (1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West
Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(4) (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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pensate the victim, she literally must "pay" for her errant ways.
Bankruptcy discharge has no such punitive connotations. Although
bankruptcy may have a social "stigma,"' 34 this stigma is rapidly disappearing as the number of bankruptcies increases and well-known,
respected companies and individuals successfully emerge from bankruptcy. 35 Thus, while restitution punishes, bankruptcy discharge offers
relief. This lack of a punitive aspect should not, however, require the
exception of restitutive obligations from Chapter 13 bankruptcy discharge. Bankruptcy discharge is not entirely without cost. The debtor
must surrender either future income under a Chapter 13 plan 36 or all
non-exempt property in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 37 Because the debtor
does "pay" for bankruptcy discharge, bankruptcy is not a free ride.
Nevertheless, if there is no change to Congress' explicit exception of
criminal restitutive obligations from Chapter 13 bankruptcy discharge, as
expressed in amended section 1328, we risk creating a modem form of
debtor's prisons. 38 Because the criminal who cannot pay restitution may
forfeit probation, incarceration is the result of the non-dischargeability of
restitutive obligations. 39 But this frustrates the rehabilitative goals at the
core of criminal restitution and bankruptcy discharge to return people to
productive participation in the economy and society. The impetus behind Congress' explicit codification of the non-dischargeability of restitutive obligations-"[t]he bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal
offenders"4°-must be examined in light of the shared policy of rehabili41
tation behind restitution and discharge.
§ 947.181 (,Vest Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 640(b) (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-35-304(a) (1990).
34. Lisa J.McIntyre, A SociologicalPerspective on Bankruptcy, 65 IND. L.J. 123, 129-33
(1989).
35.

THERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS

141 (1989)

("debt-

ors in bankruptcy are not some 'other,' but part of mainstream America").
36. See infra Part II.C.2.
37. See infra Part II.C.1.
38. Debtors' prisons were designed to compel payment by the debtor, not to punish the
debtor for failure to pay. The debtor was imprisoned until he forfeited his possessions. Jay
Cohen, The History of Imprisonmentfor Debt and its Relation to the Development of Discharge
in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HisT. 153, 155-56 (1982). Most state constitutions now prohibit
imprisonment for debt. See, eg., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("A person may not be imprisoned
in a civil action for debt or tort ....
").Current bankruptcy law reflects that imprisonment is
not an option for failure to pay debts.
39. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.051(a) (1990) (defendant may be imprisoned until restitution paid); ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 13-810(b) (1989) (court may imprison defendant for bad faith
failure to pay); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(4) (West Supp. 1992) (court may revoke probation
if defendant fails to comply with restitution order).
40. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342-43 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837.
41. This does not mean that discharge is the only aim of bankruptcy. Margaret Howard,
A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1048 (1987). The
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Part II of this Note discusses the evolution of consumer bankruptcy
discharge and the policies it serves by exploring its history from the English bankruptcy antecedents relied on by Congress in the nineteenth century to its genesis in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Part II also examines
the important role discharge has assumed in today's economy and details
the discharge provisions of Chapters 7 and 13 for individual debtors to
illuminate how this role is reflected in substantive law. Part III discusses restitution as a criminal sentencing device and the role it plays in
the criminal justice system. Part IV addresses the concerns raised when
federal bankruptcy courts interfere with state court criminal proceedings.
Part V examines Congress' amendment to Bankruptcy Code § 1328 and
explores the amendment's probable negative effect on debtor rehabilitation in light of discharge and restitution policies. Finally, Part VI proposes a solution to the conflicts between criminal restitution and
discharge by focusing on their more important common goals, and uses
current bankruptcy discharge provisions embodying more flexible provisions as a model for a suggested restitution discharge provision.
II.

Policy of the Bankruptcy Code

Today, federal bankruptcy law mediates between the competing
needs of debtors and creditors. The bankruptcy process provides a collection device for creditors by assembling the debtor's assets and ensuring an equitable division among creditors, 42 while concurrently providing
relief to debtors by granting a discharge of qualified debts.4 3 The most
recent ancestor of the Bankruptcy Code is the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 44
The Bankruptcy Act allowed debtors to voluntarily seek haven in the
bankruptcy courts, providing a discharge and a "fresh start."'4 5 Howauthor lists five commonly cited purposes of bankruptcy proceedings: (1) to serve as a unified
collection device for creditors; (2) to protect the "honest" debtor; (3) to protect particularly
worthy creditors; (4) to rehabilitate the debtor; and (5) to achieve economic efficiency by distribution of the risk of loss between debtor and creditor. Id. These factors are discussed infra in
Part II.B.

42. This is contrasted with state law, which provides "priority" in creditor status by using a "first come, first served" method. Whoever gets to the debtor's assets first through col-

lection wins. This is particularly evident with reference to secured claims, which are
prioritized according to time of perfection. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
137 (4th ed. 1991). When the debtor files for bankruptcy, state law collection efforts are barred

by the automatic stay and the bankruptcy process takes over. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp.
I 1990); see infra note 55.

43. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988) (Chapter 7); 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (Chapter 13).
44. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. For purposes of distinction in this
Note the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 will be referred to as the "Bankruptcy Act" or the "Act,"

and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 will be referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code."

45.

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Local Loan was decided under
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ever, the Bankruptcy Act was merely one step in the evolution of the
United States bankruptcy system. This evolution took place over a long
period of time, and reflects a number of economic and legal choices made
by Congress and the courts to accommodate
the need for financially
46
healthy participants in our credit economy.
The basic structure of creditor payment and debtor relief found in
modem United States bankruptcy law evolved from the English system
of bankruptcy.4 7 The rudimentary English system was very limited, providing a discharge of debts only for certain classes of debtors (traders and
merchants),4 8 and was "involuntary"--only creditors could commence a
bankruptcy case.49 The English system was notorious for its debtors'
prisons, used to coerce payment from the debtor.50 Debtor relief was
non-existent, because there was no discharge of debts.5 1 Thus, the early
English 2system was creditor-oriented and punitive with respect to the
5
debtor.
The modem Bankruptcy Code is far removed from its English antecedents. Section A of this Part discusses the various policy considerations that have shaped today's complex and forgiving debtor discharge
provisions, so that the Bankruptcy Code's policies can be understood in
relation to those underlying criminal restitution. Section B addresses the
role discharge plays in the credit economy today and its importance to
the smooth functioning of that economy. Section C discusses the discharge provisions of the current Bankruptcy Code, under both Chapter 7
and Chapter 13, and how these chapters implement the "fresh start"
ideal. Section D discusses the various exceptions to discharge and their
rationale in order to illustrate the policy considerations which should
underlie any exception to discharge, such as the one Congress has embodied in its amendment to § 1328.
A.

Evolution of United States Bankruptcy Law

The Constitution provides that the federal government has the
power to prescribe uniform bankruptcy laws.5 3 When drafting the Conthe Bankruptcy Act, which was in effect until October 1, 1979, when it was replaced by the
Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
46. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 71.
47. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 63; Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy,
89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1940).
48. Cohen, supra note 38, at 156.
49. Id. at 155.
50. Id. at 155-56.
51. Id. at 156.
52. Id. at 154 (debtor without property could be imprisoned until he reached an agreement with creditors, and creditors could require continued imprisonment).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. ("The Congress shall have Power... To establish...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies .... "). The purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause is
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stitution, the framers contemplated that these laws would resemble the
English bankruptcy system then in existence.5 4 Over the next 110 years,
various federal bankruptcy laws were enacted and repealed. 5 5 Finally, in
1898, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act, 56 which remained in effect,
with amendments,5 7 until the 1978 enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform
59
Act, 58 which contains today's Bankruptcy Code.
The English model upon which early American bankruptcy laws
were patterned traditionally supplied proceedings only for trader and
merchant debtors 60 and granted no discharge. 61 Early English proceedobscured in history, although it appears that the framers hinged its importance on the function
of commerce between the states and sought to regulate bankruptcy at a federal level in order to
facilitate commerce. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 7 (Da
Capo Press 1972) (1935).
54. The first national bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19
(repealed 1803). This law contemplated an involuntary proceeding initiated by creditors and
was confined to debtors were who merchants and traders. Vern Countryman, A History of
American Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226, 228 (1976). Creditors were required to allege an
"act of bankruptcy," which included flight, "concealment" of the debtor, or disposal of property with intent to defraud or delay. Id. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was repealed in 1803, as
it was considered only a temporary measure. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; Countryman, supra at 228.
55. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was followed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440 (repealed 1843), which extended relief to all individuals, not just merchants. Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV.941, 941
n.1 (1979). Although the main reason for the 1841 Act was the panic of 1837, it was repealed
in 1843 due to creditor dissatisfaction with the large number of discharges. Act of Mar. 3,
1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Countryman, supra note 54, at 229. The next attempt at a bankruptcy act occurred in 1867, and resulted from the economic upheavals generated by the Civil
War. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 17b, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). The 1867 Act was
the first bankruptcy legislation to grant relief to corporations. Countryman, supra note 54, at
229. However, the 1867 Act was repealed in 1878, again due to creditor dissatisfaction. Act of
June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99; Countryman, supra note 54, at 230.
During the period in which no federal bankruptcy statute was in effect, the states were
free to govern bankruptcy proceedings. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 64. Conversely, when federal bankruptcy laws have been enacted, "constitutional exclusivity has been
invoked against the states maintaining comparable legislation. The constitutional provision
does not extend, however, to void state insolvency laws. Consequently, there has been continuing judicial construction of the line where insolvency laws end and bankruptcy legislation
begins." Id.
56. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
57. The most notable amendment was the Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52
Stat. 840, though the Bankruptcy Act was revised over sixty times prior to repeal in 1978. The
Chandler Act sought to curb dishonest bankruptcies, improve administrative efficiency, and
most notably added the rehabilitative provisions of Chapter XIII. John E. Mulder, Ambiguities in the ChandlerAct, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 10, 13-14 (1940).
58. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
59. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
60. John C. McCoid II, The Originsof Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. Dnv. J. 361, 361
(1988).
61. Discharge did not enter English bankruptcy law until 1705. See Countryman, supra
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ings were also involuntary, 62 and the debtor was often imprisoned. 63 The
64

debtor was only able to obtain release from prison by paying his debts.
These proceedings served primarily as a mechanism for the collection of
debts and distribution of the debtor's assets to creditors. 65 An important
landmark was reached in 1705, when English law introduced disan emcharge. 66 Imprisonment also declined as courts recognized that
67
ployed debtor could pay more promptly than one in prison.
During the nineteenth century, American bankruptcy laws underwent several metamorphoses that distanced them from their English
predecessors. Bankruptcy law was in a state of flux during this period;
the bankruptcy laws that were enacted often were quickly repealed in the
face of political opposition. The changes that did take place during this
period, however, recognized the importance of debt relief and, thus, were
characterized by the greater availability of an enhanced discharge.
Although debtors' prisons existed in the United States well into the
1840s, 65 they suffered a decline at the hands of reformers and were prohibited by many state constitutions during this period as recognition of
their futility led to their abolishment. 69 The 1841 Bankruptcy Act was
the first American law to provide for discharge in the context of voluntary proceedings for merchants and non-merchants. 70 This Act also allowed the debtor to retain certain necessary property. 7 1 The 1841 Act
was short-lived, however, and was repealed in 1843. The Civil War and
resulting financial upheavals provided the impetus for the Bankruptcy
Act of 1867,72 which permitted voluntary proceedings for merchants,
note 54, at 227 (citing An Act to prevent Frauds frequently committed by Bankrupts, 4 & 5
Anne, ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.)).

62.

McCoid, supra note 60, at 361 n.4 (English law did not allow voluntary bankruptcy

until 1849). American law followed this tradition: the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 provided only

for involuntary proceedings. Countryman, supra note 54, at 228.
63. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 153 (imprisonment for debt used intermittantly in England for over 600 years).
64. Countryman, supra note 54, at 227.
65. Cohen, supra note 38, at 156.
66.

An Act to prevent Frauds frequently committed by Bankrupts, 4 & 5 Anne, ch. 17,

§ 8 (1705) (Eng.). However, this discharge was not rehabilitative in character but rather an
incentive for the debtor to disclose his assets to his creditors for collection. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395 n.5 (1985).

67.

Cohen, supra note 38, at 159.

68.

See Countryman, supra note 54, at 229; see also McIntyre, supra note 34, at 126

(three out of eight residents of Philadelphia spent time in debtor's prisons in the 1820s) (quoting PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 287-88 (1974)).
69. Countryman, supra note 54, at 229; cf Cohen, supra note 38, at 159 (English law
recognized that confined debtors were unable to pay debts; releasing debtors would facilitate

creditor payment).
70.
71.
72.

Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
Countryman, supra note 54, at 229.
Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
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non-merchants, and corporations. 73 The 1867 Act provided exemptions
for necessaries and denied discharge for certain specified acts. The
debtor's discharge, however, was granted for good behavior regardlessof
creditor consent. 74 This Act was repealed in 1878 because of both creditor opposition to the expanded pro-debtor provisions and regional
75
opposition.
The increasing desire to grant relief to overburdened debtors 76 that
resulted from the emergence of the nineteenth century industrialized
economy culminated in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 7 7 The 1898 Act
provided as much relief for debtors as the prior acts, but included "compositions" (repayment plans) 78 and special provisions for important industrial companies, such as railroads. 79 Thus, bankruptcy proceedings
had become available to all parties, not only traders and merchants.so
Additionally, the 1898 Act did not consider ability to repay as a condition to granting discharge.8 ' Instead, the 1898 Act formally recognized
that debtor relief, and not solely creditor repayment, was a legitimate
objective of bankruptcy. 2 As the bias against discharge gradually
abated8 3 and a policy of favoring a debtor's return to participation in the
economy emerged as a goal of bankruptcy law, 84 the focus of bankruptcy
73. Countryman, supra note 54, at 229.
74. Id. at 230.
75. Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat 99; Countryman, supra note 54, at 230; William
M. Wiecek, The Reconstructionof FederalJudicialPower, 1863-1875, 13 J. AM. HIST. 333, 357
(1969). The regional opposition to the 1867 Act reflected the continuing antagonism between
the North and South following the Civil War. Northern "creditors felt that the [1867] [A]ct
was too lenient on Southern debtors. Southerners and westerners voiced their instinctive fears
of federal courts and national laws providing for the collection of debts." Wiecek, supra at
357.
76. Hallinan, supra note 29, at 56. Hallinan notes that the expanded political power of
entrepreneurs created a change in societal attitudes towards borrowing. The economic risks
inherent in borrowing were detached from notions of dishonest and irresponsible use of credit.
Id.
77. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
78. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544; Countryman, supra note 54, at 231.
79. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544; Countryman, supra note 54, at 231.
80. The second bankruptcy act made relief available to all parties unable to meet their
financial obligations. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843); see also
McCoid, supra note 60, at 361-62.
81. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 544, 550, repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682; see also Hallinan, supra
note 29, at 60.
82. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544; Hallinan, supra note 29, at 60.
83. Hallinan, supra note 29, at 57 (debtor's position was now viewed as the result of
"misfortune rather than blameworthiness").
84. Id. at 62-64.
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law shifted to debtor interests as the value of debtor rehabilitation was
85
recognized.
Furthermore, bankruptcy legislation at a federal level was crucial to
the emerging industrialized economy. As Madison had recognized over
100 years earlier, a uniform federal bankruptcy law was an important
component of the federal government's need to control and promote
commerce.8 6 The various nineteenth century state insolvency laws created regional turmoil, threatened the growth and prosperity of the
emerging industrial economy, and led to recognition of the need for a
uniform, federal law. 87 In 1935 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act, explicitly recognizing the departure that
had occurred from the English model"" and the need to accommodate
the tremendous growth in the industrial economy. 89 The Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 represents the first evidence of maturation of the bankruptcy
process from the limited, creditor-aligned English model to the broad
debtor-relief provisions familiar today. 90
B.

Bankruptcy Law Today: The "Fresh Start" 91

The 1898 Bankruptcy Act, however, was not resilient enough to accommodate further changes in the economy, most notably the rise of
85. Boshkoff, supra note 28, at 109-10 (" '[he State is more interested in having an
honest debtor relieved from obligations he can not meet, and given an opportunity to better
support and educate his family ....than in having him held in financial bondage forever by
individual creditors.' ") (quoting 30 CONG. REC. 603 (1898) (statement of Sen. Lindsay)).
86. WARREN, supra note 53, at 7 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison)).
87. If the debtor's property was in several different states, each without jurisdiction over
property in another state, judgments could not be enforced. State collection actions were thus
of limited effectiveness. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 64. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 258-68 (1827) (an early recognition that state-granted debtor
discharge was no defense in a sister state collection action); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
0.01-07 (James W. Moore ed., 14th ed. 1974). The author notes:
The main inadequacy of the state insolvency laws ... was the inability to give a
discharge which would be effective in other states.
It was inevitable that Congress would be called upon to exercise its legislative
power over the subject of bankruptcies. An expanding commercial union would require it; financial stringency would accelerate the demand. This latter element has
been the culminating factor in producing the Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867 and 1898 ....
Id. 5 0.03. However, at no time did federal bankruptcy laws supplant state collection remedies. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 64.
88. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Is. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S.
648, 669 (1935) (power of Congress under Bankruptcy Clause not limited by English law); see
also Countryman, supra note 54, at 231.
89. Countryman, supra note 54, at 231 (quoting ContinentalIll. Nat'7 Bank, 294 U.S. at
669, 671-72).
90. This is reflected by the fact that the Bankruptcy Act remained in effect, with amendments, until passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, and provided the framework for bankruptcy during most of the twentieth century.
91. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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individual consumer bankruptcies after World War 11.92 In the late
1960s, the Brookings Institution undertook an empirical study which revealed that the Bankruptcy Act was inadequate to meet the modem
needs of debtors and creditors. 93 In 1970, Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 94 to conduct a similar analysis. The findings of the Brookings Institution and the
Bankruptcy Commission were very similar 95 and revealed problems in
the administration of bankruptcy cases, including: an increasing use of
96
consumer bankruptcies after World War II that burdened the system,
non-uniform use of Chapter XIII provisions, 9 7 and administrative inefficiencies resulting in trivial benefits to creditors. 98 Further, procedural
rules that conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act effectively nullified many
substantive provisions of the Act, impairing the bankruptcy courts' effectiveness. 99 Lastly, because much of the substantive law applied in bankruptcy proceedings relied on state provisions, the Bankruptcy Act was a
"hodgepodge" and thus administratively inadequate to meet the needs of
creditors and debtors.10 0 The Bankruptcy Commission's report led to a
complete overhaul of the Bankruptcy Act, culminating in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.101
92. Congress noted the problems occasioned by the growth in the number of consumer
debtors: "In the post-War years, consumer credit has become a major industry, and buying on
time has become a way of life for a large segment of the population. The bankruptcy rate
among consumers has risen accordingly, but without the requiredprovisions in the Bankruptcy
Act to protect those who need bankruptcy relief. This bill [the new Bankruptcy Code] makes
bankruptcy a more effective remedy .. " H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966 (emphasis added).
93. See DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM (1971) (Brookings Institution report).
94. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970) (Bankruptcy Study Commission).
95. GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1 (2d ed.
1988).
96. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Id. at 3.
99. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 3. The Supreme Court promulgated Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that superseded any contrary provision in the Bankruptcy Act if the rule
concerned a matter of "practice or procedure." Treister notes that "[s]ince a considerable
portion of [the Bankruptcy] Act was in the nature of 'practice and procedure,' many of its
provisions were, in effect, repealed by the Bankruptcy Rules .... The courts and lawyers were
left to determine for themselves which portions of the Act were 'substantive' and therefore still
effective." Id.
100. Id. at 5. "[N]o wholesale reexamination of the bankruptcy law had taken place to
determine whether the dual bankruptcy principles of fairness in the treatment of creditors and
the grant of a fresh start to the debtor were being served by the use of state substantive provisions." Id.
101. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. Many of the changes wrought by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act are beyond the scope of this Note, but certain salient features should be noted.
Under the Act, the bankruptcy judges (designated as "referees" and appointed by district court
judges to six-year terms) were heavily involved in the minute administrative aspects of the
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(1) Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

The Bankruptcy Code 10 2 provides five avenues of relief to an insolvent debtor: (1) Chapter 7,103 or liquidation, in which the debtor's nonexempt'0 4 assets are liquidated and the proceeds distributed to creditors
pro-rata, with the debtor receiving a discharge;10 5 (2) Chapter 9, which
provides relief for municipalities; 0 6 (3) Chapter 11 reorganizations for
individuals, partnerships, and corporations; 10 7 (4) Chapter 12, which
case, which the Commission found detracted from the referees' "judicial objectivity." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 93-94. The Bankruptcy Reform Act removed much administrative responsibility from the referees, and they were designated as "bankruptcy judges,"
appointed by the President to 14-year terms, and given broader powers. TREISTER, supra note
95, at 23-25.
The lack of tenure of the new bankruptcy judges subjected the Bankruptcy Courts to a
constitutional attack in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982), as an impermissible delegation of Article III power to an Article I court. The
Northern Pipeline decision was stayed to enable Congress to restructure the bankruptcy courts.
A second three-month stay was granted after Congress failed to act, and when the second stay
expired, the ruling of Northern Pipeline took effect. The Judicial Conference then recommended a model Emergency Rule to govern bankruptcy proceedings until Congress took action. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Emergency Rule, and in the meantime,
Congress reformulated bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 25-33.
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (hereinafter BAFJA), sought to correct some of the problems raised by Northern
Pipeline. BAFJA vested district courts with primary bankruptcy jurisdiction, with the bankruptcy courts as "adjuncts." Since the district courts were Article III courts, this overcame
the problem of Northern Pipeline. Today "the bankruptcy judges.., constitute a unit of the
district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district." 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988);
TREISTER, supra note 95, at 33. BAFJA's changes relating to Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies
that are pertinent to this Note are explored infra in Part II.C.
102. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 701-766 (1988).
104. Exemptions are specified in 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Exemptions
assist the debtor in obtaining a fresh start by enabling the debtor to keep specified property (or
income, in the case of a Chapter 13) to provide a foundation for the future. Steven L. Harris,
A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg'sBankruptcy Law In Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327, 34041 (1982) (The "fresh start is an appropriate goal of bankruptcy law and.., exemptions are
supposed to promote that goal."). Property (or income) exempted is beyond the reach of creditors, since it is no longer part of the debtor's estate. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 299. The
Bankruptcy Act relied exclusively on state law to define what property would be exempt,
which resulted in many inconsistencies. The Commission established to study bankruptcy in
1970 recommended a national exemption system. See Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
A compromise was reached, (1) allowing the debtor to choose between the federal or state
exemptions, and (2) allowing the states to opt out of the federal exemption scheme, thus requiring debtors to use the state exemptions. Nearly three-fourths of the states have opted out
of the federal scheme. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 299-301. The scope of such state exemption statutes is beyond the scope of this Note. See infra note 170 for a discussion of particular
federal exemptions.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
106. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1988).
107. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988). The debtor's business is rehabilitated as a going con-
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provides relief for family farmers;10 8 and (5) Chapter 13, which provides
relief for individual debtors with specified incomes and requires repayment to creditors. 10 9 The bankruptcy court has broad jurisdiction over
cases,110 civil proceedings,1 1111 3and property, x1 2 and is the only place
debtor relief may be granted.
Today, bankruptcy law is often characterized as having the twin
purposes of providing for efficient debt collection and granting debtor
relief through discharge.1 14 As a debt collection device, bankruptcy provides equitable treatment for creditors and avoids the race between creditors to collection that often results under state insolvency laws.11 5
Debtor relief is a distinct and independent policy of modem bankruptcy
law: 16 the debtor need not be insolvent to petition for relief, 117 and theocern through the plan of reorganization, and provides a fresh start through the binding effect
of the plan. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 17.
108. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1988). Chapter 12, enacted in 1986, was designed to be a
temporary remedy to alleviate the farming crisis of the 1980s and is due to expire on October
1, 1993. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 17.
109. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988). What constitutes a bankruptcy case is subject to debate,
but includes the bankruptcy petition and the proceedings on the petition. TREISrER, supra
note 95, at 35. Bankruptcy courts exercise such jurisdiction pursuant to a district court's
referral under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988). This subsection gives district courts original but not
exclusive jurisdiction over civil proceedings which arise under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code).
Practically speaking, this includes adversary matters "relating" to the bankruptcy case.
TREISTER, supra note 95, at 37-43.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1988). This provision gives district courts "exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such
case, and of property of the estate." Id. This provision reflects the fact that bankruptcy courts
are primarily vehicles for in rem actions to determine the rights to property. TREISTER, supra
note 95, at 43.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988). Subsection 1334(a) gives district courts "original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11" (the Bankruptcy Code). Because bankruptcy
courts are adjuncts to district courts, their jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 shall be referred
to as bankruptcy court jurisdiction. See supra note 101.
114. See, e.g., Vickie L. Vaska, Comment, Property of the Estate After Confirmation of a
Chapter 13 Repayment Plan: Balancing Competing Interests, 65 WASH. L. REv. 677, 678
(1990) (articulating dual goals of Chapter 13 proceedings).
115. Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV.
99, 114 & n.144 (1990) (bankruptcy eliminates "costly and competitive collection efforts facing
multiple creditors under state law").
116. Jackson, supra note 66, at 1395-96.
117. The Code defines "insolvency" as the "financial condition such that the sum of such
entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of...
property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such entity's creditors ... [and] property that may be exempted from property of the estate under
section 522 .. " 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (Supp. 111990). Further, "[t]here is nothing in the
Act which requires the person to be insolvent, and there seems to be no reason why, if a
solvent person cares to have his property distributed among his creditors through bankruptcy
I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note
1..."
proceedings, he should not be allowed to do so .
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retically discharge could be granted without providing any debt collection for creditors. This Note is concerned with the discharge policy of
bankruptcy; its merits as a collection device are considered only as it
relates to the granting of discharge.
(2) The Costs and Benefits of Discharge

The bankruptcy courts' scope and power is a function of the importance of bankruptcy proceedings to the economy's efficient performance.
Today, bankruptcy is viewed as a normal and integral part of a capitalistic economy.1 18 Bankruptcy discharge is central to maintaining a
smoothly functioning credit economy;119 an economy functions best with
the highest possible number of healthy participants. 120 Bankruptcy discharge, therefore, promotes economic rehabilitation of debtors by providing a fresh start so debtors can continue to participate in the economy.
There are many theories regarding the role of discharge in bankruptcy and its relation to the complex economic and social factors comprising our capitalistic society. 121 For example, discharge can be viewed
as the individual counterpart of a corporation's limited liability. 122 Nevertheless, the salient purposes of the bankruptcy discharge are financial
rehabilitation of the debtor12 3 and her return to productive participation
in the open credit market. 124 The relief afforded by bankruptcy recognizes that a productive individual is worth more to society than a destitute person. 125
The benefits of discharge, however, are not without cost. Discharge
to debtors results in financial loss to creditors through unpaid debts, and
87,

4.03, at 580-81; see also 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) (in defining who may be a debtor under

Chapters 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, no mention is made of insolvency).

118. McIntyre, supra note 34, at 127; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 6 (portraying bankruptcy as a hospital for the financially sick). This economic model, however, is
not all-inclusive; other factors are at work. See infra Part II.B.
119. In fact, bankruptcy discharge is so important that a debtor cannot waive his right to
receive a discharge in advance of bankruptcy proceedings in order to obtain credit. See generally Jackson, supra note 66, at 1394.
120. "[S]ociety needs the activity of every one of its members; ... while a man, whose
earnings are entirely at his creditors' mercy, would be little disposed to work, he might, if freed
from this burden, retrieve his reputation and become a valuable member of the community."
Hallinan, supra note 29, at 57 n.24 (citing Edwin S. Mack, Bankruptcy Legislation, 28 AM. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1894)).

121. See, eg., Hallinan, supra note 29, at 96; Hillman, supra note 115, at 109; Howard,
supra note 41, at 1069; Jackson, supra note 66, at 1398.
122. Jackson, supra note 66, at 1400.
123. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S.Ct. 654, 659 (1991) ("[A] central purpose of the Code is to
[permit] debtors [to] reorder their affairs, [and] make peace with their creditors ....); NLRB
v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) ("[P]olicy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful
rehabilitation of debtors.").
124.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 71.

125.

Hillman, supra note 115, at 111.
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creditors must accommodate this loss. Creditors, who profit from their
loans, are naturally willing to bear the risk of some loss through discharge to ensure that they have many loan "customers." 12 6 Consumers'
knowledge that they can obtain a discharge if overburdened alleviates
their fears of ruthless collection methods, and encourages them to obtain
credit.127 While discharge results in higher credit costs for the average
consumer, 128 the presence of bankruptcy discharge has not deterred creditors from granting credit. 129 Instead, the costs of discharged debt are
spread among the population in the form of higher interest rates.1 30 Borrowers, in turn, tolerate these higher rates because they recognize the
financial benefits bankruptcy may provide if the need arises.131
Some commentators, however, maintain that bankruptcy discharge
may encourage bankruptcy and careless borrowing.1 32 The economic
model which posits that creditors are better risk bearers of financial
problems ignores the fact that debtors may be in a better position to evaluate their own financial health.1 3 3 Borrowers' awareness of the safety net
of discharge may encourage profligate spending and a subsequent resort
to bankruptcy, because debtors know they have already "paid" for their
126. In the context of the possibility of loan defaults and bankruptcy, higher credit costs
are a form of risk allocation. Creditors may be in a better position to evaluate the risks due to
their experience and ability to accumulate and evaluate default statistics. They can thus insure
against loan default by spreading default costs among all borrowers. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra
note 29, at 98. However, one could argue that debtors are in just as good a position to evaluate
their risk of loan default. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA
L. REv. 953, 981-83 (1981) (arguing that debtors may be better able to assess likelihood of
default and that some lenders are at an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis debtors).
127. Discharge "provides the debtor with credit insurance coverage in an amount equal to
his dischargeable liabilities .... the collections consequences of non-payment [are] more burdensome to him than whatever burdens might accompany his resort to bankruptcy." Hallinan, supra note 29, at 100.
128. Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 983.
129. Given the dismal collections obtained by creditors once a borrower files for ban:ruptcy, it is not surprising that creditors must account for discharge "costs." For example,
97% of Chapter 7 liquidations result in no dividend to creditors, and the average Chapter 13
provides payment of approximately 57% of debts. The effective focus of consumer bankruptcies is thus not on debt collection but discharge, which leaves creditors to suffer the loss. U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978-A BEFORE AND
AFTER LOOK 45 (1983).

130. Hillman, supra note 115, at 126. The various economic theories by which creditors
allocate the risk of discharge are beyond the scope of this Note. For a comprehensive discussion, see Hallinan, supra note 29, at 98.
131. Jackson, supra note 66, at 1415; Howard, supra note 41, at 1067 ("One way of viewing the added cost [higher interest rates] is as an insurance premium, paid by all users of credit
to insure their own access to bankruptcy relief in the event of financial disaster.").
132. Hallinan, supra note 29, at 66; Hillman, supra note 115, at 126-27 (debtor may not
bear total cost of his own bankruptcy discharge because discharge cost in form of higher interest rates is distributed among all creditors).
133. Eisenberg, supra note 126 at 981-83; Hillman, supra note 115, at 126.
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own discharge.1 34 Bankruptcy discharge may also undermine the sanctity of contract, 13 5 although
contract law does recognize "excuse" as a
136
defense to performance.
The Bankruptcy Code deals with these "moral hazards" 13 7 in its
discharge exception provisions, which limit debt relief by providing it
only to those debtors who have acted without fraud or deceit, and the
Code excludes from discharge certain debts for policy reasons. 138 These
exceptions safeguard the bankruptcy process by ensuring that it will be
used only by the "honest" but overburdened debtor.
Bankruptcy discharge also serves non-economic ends. Discharge
provides an emotional purgative from the oppression of debt; the sheer
magnitude of overwhelming debt can be demoralizing. 139 Discharge provides freedom from the dishonor of the inability to pay debts, provides a
psychological haven from creditors'40 and renews the debtor's optimism
and self-confidence.1 4 1 Indeed, a debtor's potential discharge or acute
insolvency may actually reduce pre-bankruptcy creditor collection efforts, giving the debtor an added psychological bonus.1 4 2 The judicial
sanction of discharge and the act of surrendering one's assets 43 or future
1 45
income 44 allows the debtor to feel entitled to society's forgiveness.
134. Hillman, supra note 115 at 126-27; Jackson, supra note 66, at 1402. Jackson states
that bankruptcy "discharge imposes much of the risk of ill-advised credit decisions not on
social insurance programs but on creditors." Id Jackson notes that this is the "moral hazard"
problem, which results when individuals "undervalue the costs of engaging in risky activities
today because they can depend on society to bear a portion of the costs that may arise tomorrow." Id.
135. Hillman, supra note 115, at 134.
136. Indeed, contract excuse and bankruptcy discharge are analogous in that both reflect
equitable considerations in relieving unfortunate participants. See generallyid. (discussing the
value of the approach of contract excuse to bankruptcy discharge analysis).
137. See supra note 134; Jackson, supra note 66, at 1402.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 523 contains the exceptions to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988 & Supp.
11 1990). The policy considerations underlying these exceptions are discussed infra in Part
II.D.1.
139. Jackson, supra note 66, at 1421 (suggesting that debtors would be inclined to substitute leisure time for gainful employment if their debts were too large to pay).
140. The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code give the debtor breathing
room from collection proceedings while she reorganizes her affairs. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
(1988); see also TREISTER, supra note 95, at 195 ("[P]urpose of automatic stay is to give the
...debtor some 'breathing time' for rehabilitation.").
141. Hillman, supra note 115, at 124; Howard, supra note 41, at 1061; Jackson, supra note
66, at 1406.
142. Marjorie L. Girth, The Role of EmpiricalData in Developing Bankruptcy Legislation
for Individuals, 65 IND. L.J. 17, 28 (1989) (creditors may forego collection efforts of debtors
with no assets).
143. Chapter 7 provides a discharge in exchange for surrender of the debtor's non-exempt
assets. See infra Part II.C.I.
144. Chapter 13 grants a discharge in exchange for the debtor surrendering her future
income to pay creditor claims. See infra Part II.C.2.
145. Hillman, supra note 115, at 120.
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The broad scope of modem bankruptcy discharge represents a shift away
from the stigma of insolvency to a recognition of debtors as sympathetic
1 46
victims of events beyond their control and worthy of rehabilitation.
The federalization of bankruptcy laws has furthered the decline of bankruptcy's emotional stigma by "legitimizing" discharge. 14 7
Although resort to bankruptcy is, as a practical matter, relatively
simple,1 48 it does not occur as frequently as the purely economic analysis
would suggest. Some insolvents, due to the residual emotional and social
stigma of bankruptcy, stubbornly refuse to file bankruptcy even when it
would be in their best financial interests. 149 Refusal to file contravenes
what the economic model suggests: when the benefits of bankruptcy out-

weigh the costs, people will opt for bankruptcy.1 50 The Bankruptcy
Code recognizes this potential stigma and attempts to ameliorate its effects in order to promote the fresh start. For example, § 525 prohibits
the government from discriminating against former debtors in employment or in the grant of licenses.' 5 ' This discrimination prohibition also

extends to private parties, who may not terminate or discriminate against
an employee because of a prior bankruptcy proceeding.'

52

These Code

provisions reflect a policy that bankruptcy should not stigmatize debtors
in the employment arena, because to do so would subvert the fresh start

policy by inhibiting debtors' return to full economic productivity.
(3) The Net Social and Economic Benefit of Discharge
In spite of the negative factors attendant to bankruptcy discharge,

the need for it is not seriously questioned.1 53 By placing the risk of loss
on creditors, discharge protects unsuspecting debtors from questionable
146. Id. at 112 (debtors need protection from "wily creditors").
147. Id. at 128.
148. The debtor need only file a petition, and the right to relief is not conditioned on any
purely financial factors, such as ability to pay or assets. See supra note 117.
149. McIntyre, supra note 34, at 129-30. Studies have shown that up to 65% of unpaid
debts are owed by debtors who have not filed bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Courtsof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 34 (1981).
150. McIntyre, supra note 34, at 128-29.
151. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988); see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 654 (1971) (holding
that state may not refuse to renew driver's license of debtor when debtor received discharge of
tort judgment, because to do so would frustrate fresh start policy).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b)(I)-(3) (1988).
153. Howard, supra note 41, at 1047 & n.4 (discharge provisions have been part of every.
bankruptcy statute passed by Congress). Criticisms of bankruptcy discharge focus not on
whether we should have it at all, but on various particular shortcomings, some of which are
discussed supra in Part II.B and infra in Part II.C. For some discussions of bankruptcy discharge and its various aspects, see Hallinan, supra note 29; Hillman, supra note 115; Jackson,
supra note 66; Jack L. Van Baalen, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13-What Price the "Better
Discharge"?,35 OKLA. L. REv. 455 (1982); John C. Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 107, 108.
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credit collection efforts, a benefit for which consumers are willing to pay
with increased credit rates.' 54 Further, discharge has a paternalistic aspect in relieving debtors from the results of imprudent and ill-advised
conduct, the risks of which they are poorly equipped to evaluate and
appreciate fully. 155 Most importantly, discharge prevents costly social
externalities by keeping debtors off the welfare rolls. 156 Thus, those who
want to participate in credit transactions, not taxpayers as a whole, are
the ones who bear the costs of discharge. By limiting cause and effect in
this way, bankruptcy is economically fair: only those who use credit are
required to bear the additional cost of discharge. Furthermore, because
bankruptcy terminates collection actions, the debtor is less likely to
"loaf' to prevent the accumulation of assets which would be subject to
collection by his creditors. 5 7 Thus, discharge provides an important
so15 8
cial benefit by insuring that productivity does not decline.
C.

The Price of Bankruptcy Discharge: Chapters 7 and 13

The policies of bankruptcy discharge are implemented in practice by
the filing, administration, discharge, and closing of an individual debtor's

case. Countervailing policies are addressed within the bankruptcy framework through the non-dischargeability of certain debts. 159 To illuminate

the context of non-dischargeability of a particular debt (e.g., criminal restitution), the following discussion of the mechanics of bankruptcy illustrates how the debtor obtains a discharge, what factors into the bargain
between the debtor wishing to obtain a discharge and his creditors, and
the legal process that grants the discharge. The individual debtor contemplating bankruptcy has two choices:16 a Chapter 7 liquidation' 6' or
154.

Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., Rejoinder: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984
1087, 1096.
155. Jackson, supra note 66, at 1415.
156. Id. at 1402 ("If there were no right of discharge, an individual who lost his assets to
creditors might rely instead on social welfare programs... . [D]ischarge imposes much of the
risk of ill-advised credit decisions not on social insurance programs but on creditors.").
157. See, e.g., id. at 1420.
158. Id. Nevertheless, some commentators have questioned the rehabilitative value of
bankruptcy, noting the lack of counseling provided to debtors. in fact, the Commission sought
to include counseling as part of the bankruptcy process in its 1973 recommendations. See
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 74. There is some evidence that the budgetary constrictions of Chapter XIII under the old Bankruptcy Act may have provided instruction in
financial discipline to debtors. Milton J.Morris, Note, The Wage EarnerPlan-A Superior
Alternative to Straight Bankruptcy, 9 UTAH L. REV. 730, 737 (1965).
159. See generally infra Part II.D.1 and notes 202-216.
160. Actually, the debtor has three choices because an individual debtor can file Chapter
11 if her debts exceed the limits of Chapter 13. Furthermore, "local legal culture" expressed
by attorneys' preferences and the chapter into which they guide their clients may influence the
debtor's choice, a choice which may not be in the debtor's best interests. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 246-52.
161. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).

Wis. L.

REV.
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a Chapter 13 plan. 162 The debtors' choice of Chapter 7 or 13 depends on
many factors, including: the amount she owes, 163 the nature and extent
of her property, and whether she has a regular income stream sufficient
to pay creditors under a Chapter 13 plan. In addition, the discharge 164
'
afforded the debtor under these two chapters differs in certain respects
and may influence the debtor's selection of Chapter 7 or 13. Depending
on the selection made, the cost of discharge is either future wages (Chapter 13) or non-exempt property (Chapter 7).
(1) Chapter 7
165
In a Chapter 7 case, the debtor surrenders her non-exempt assets
in exchange for a discharge of pre-existing debts, regardless of the extent
to which creditors are repaid.1 66 Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee appointed to administer the debtor's assets obtains legal
title to the estate's property. 167 If there are sufficient non-exempt assets,
the trustee liquidates those assets and pays creditors pro-rata. If the
debtor's non-exempt assets are insufficient to pay creditors, the case is
administered as a "no-asset" case, with creditors receiving nothing. 168 A
finding that property is exempt means that creditors cannot reach that
property to satisfy their claims; the trustee cannot liquidate that property. 169 Under the § 522 exemption provisions, the debtor may either
1 70
choose state law exemptions or avail herself of the federal provisions.
Exempt property generally includes necessaries not exceeding a certain

162. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
163. Though this is irrelevant to eligibility for bankruptcy, it becomes important under a
Chapter 13 plan, in which the debtor repays some or all of her debts.
164. Discharge refers to the comprehensive discharge of the debtor from pre-petition
debts, and is distinct from the "non-dischargeability" issue of a particular debt. In all proceedings certain classes of debts are non-dischargeable; though a debtor can receive a "discharge,"
at the same time a creditor can receive a determination that her debt is non-dischargeable in
the bankruptcy proceedings for the various reasons listed in § 523. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988
& Supp. 11 1990). This distinction between the general "discharge" and "dischargeability" of
a particular debt is not crucial to this Note, since the impetus behind both is the same. See
infra note 241.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
166. Creditors of a Chapter 7 debtor often receive nothing. Most Chapter 7 cases are "noasset"; there are negligible non-exempt assets for the trustee to administer and so the case is
usually closed without administration of any assets. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (duties of
trustee); BANKR. R. 2015 (same); Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 89 B.R. 100, 101 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1988) (describing "No Asset Report" filed by trustee where there are no assets worth
liquidating for the benefit of creditors).
167. Property of the estate is defined in I1 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
168. See supra note 166.
169. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 299.
170. Exemptions may be claimed under federal statute, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), or the debtor's
domicile state exemption statute. Some states have opted out of federal exemption scheme and
the debtor must claim exemptions under the state statute. However, under the federal scheme,
I1 U.S.C. § 522(d) provides the debtor may exempt, inter alia, the following property:
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value. 17 1 Thus, Chapter 7 does not completely divest the debtor of all
property; the debtor is left with enough so that her fresh start is not
172
hampered by the need to re-equip herself with the necessaries of life.
Because Chapter 7 proceedings leave the debtor with some property,
the Bankruptcy Code does not provide relief from all debts. The Chapter
7 discharge excludes certain types of debts, reflecting a policy judgment
that certain kinds of debts should be repaid. These include liability for
willful and malicious injuries (intentional torts), 173 spousal and child support, 174 credit obtained by false pretenses, 175 educational loans, 176 and
177
governmental fines and penalties.
(2) Chapter 13
By contrast, the Chapter 13 debtor keeps her property but must use
future income to satisfy creditor claims. 178 The debtor may choose
Chapter 13 if she has significant non-exempt assets (which would be sub(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor ... uses as a residence ....
(2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in one motor vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item or
$4,000 in aggregate value, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments ....
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade ....
(10) The debtor's right to receive(A) a social security benefit;
(D) alimony, support, or separate maintenance ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
172. This policy is also embodied in the non-waivability of exemptions. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(e) (1988).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
174. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
175. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1988).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988). This section was crucial to the Kelly court's finding of
non-dischargeability of criminal restitutive obligations. The Court determined that § 523(a)(7)
applied though the statute did not specifically state "restitution." It was also unclear whether
restitution was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss" because there are two possible interpretations of restitution: punishment and compensation. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 5051 (1986). For the Court's analysis of the restitution dischargeability problem, see infra Part
V, and for a detailed discussion of restitution, see infra Part III. Discharge exceptions are
discussed more fully infra Part II.D.1.
178. "[T]he purpose of Chapter 13 is to provide the maximum recovery to creditors while
at the same time leaving the debtor sufficient money to pay for his or her basic living expenses." In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). The Jones court obviously still
believes creditor payment is the only focus of bankruptcy.
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ject to administration in a Chapter 7 case) or property secured by liens
which would be sold by the bankruptcy trustee in a Chapter 7 liquida-

tion. Chapter 13 is limited to individuals owing less than $100,000 in
unsecured debts, and less than $350,000 in secured debts. 179 Although

the debtor must have regular income, she can retain her property 18 0
while creditors are repaid. Repayment of creditiors is made pursuant to
the debtor's Chapter 13 plan of repayment, which the debtor proposes
after initiating the case. 8 1 Income beyond normal living expenses is
"disposable income" 182 and must be devoted to paying creditors. Creditors must receive, pursuant to the plan, as much as they would under a
Chapter 7 liquidation. 18 3 The repayment period under a Chapter 13 plan
is fixed at three years, but with court approval the plan can take up to
five years.18 4 After proposal of the Chapter 13 plan, the court confirms
the debtor's plan, 185 which does not require creditor approval.1 86 A confirmed plan binds all creditors to its provisions. 187 The plan's post-con179. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
180. The Chapter 13 debtor's property includes that of a Chapter 7 debtor as specified in
§ 541, but also includes property acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case:
most importantly, the debtor's earnings, which are used to fund the plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1306(a) (1988). In contrast, a Chapter 7 case does not include after-acquired property. See
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (property of the debtor's estate).
181. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322(a) (1988).
182. Disposable income is defined as "income which is received by the debtor and which is
not reasonably necessary to be expended.., for the maintenance or support of the debtor." 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988).
183. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988). Initially, Chapter 13 was interpreted to allow "zero
payment" plans. See, e.g., Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118,
1122 (9th Cir. 1983) (plan that provided for no payment to unsecured creditors comported
with § 1328(a) and such debts were discharged). However, many bankruptcy judges viewed
this provision as inadequate to protect unsecured creditors, and felt that some debtors were
taking advantage of Chapter 13 to obtain its more generous discharge by proposing to pay less
than they potentially were able. Chapter 13 plans must now satisfy the "good faith" standard,
which considers amount of proposed payments and ability to pay, and the accuracy of financial
data reported. The "good faith" standard was established by BAFJA. See supra note 101;
infra note 198; see also In re Lattimore, 69 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (holding
that plan that provided for no payment to unsecured claims was "abuse of purpose and spirit
of Chapter 13" and thus did not satisfy "good faith" standard); TREISTER, supra note 95, at
343; Joseph P. Corish & Michael J. Herbert, The Debtor'sDilemma: DisposableIncome as the
Cost of Chapter13 Dischargein ConsumerBankruptcy, 47 LA. L. REv. 47, 50 (1986). Further
protection of creditors is found in § 1325(b), which allows creditors or the Chapter 13 trustee
to object to the proposed payments. The plan will not be confirmed over any objection unless
it provides that the objecting creditor will be paid in full or that plan payments expend all of
the debtor's "disposable income" for three years. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 343.
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988). The short repayment periods are designed mostly for
administrative efficiency. Under Chapter XIII of the Act, no such time limitation was placed
on repayment, which resulted in debtors being under court supervision for years.
185. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988).
186. Id. This approval is subject to exceptions contained in § 1325(b), discussed supra
note 183.
187. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (1988).
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firmation effect on the debtor's property is not clear,188 though the Code
which is vested in the debtor is free
provides that property of the18debtor
9
and clear of creditor claims.
Chapter 13 is much more generous than Chapter 7 in the discharge
granted. Chapter 7 excepts from discharge a broad category of debts
listed in § 523, while Chapter 13 only excepts child and spousal support,
educational loans, 190 personal injury damages resulting from drunk driv-

ing, 191 long-term debts provided for in the plan, 192 and criminal restitu-

tion.1 93 The Chapter
13 debtor thus receives what is known as the
"super discharge."' 194 This discharge is granted at the time payments
under the plan are completed. 95 If the debtor is unable to complete payments under the plan, she may be entitled to a hardship discharge. This
hardship discharge is conditioned upon the court's determination of
188. It is unclear whether bankruptcy protection extends to property acquired after confirmation of the plan. See, for example, Vaska, supranote 114, at 682, and cases cited therein: In
re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (estate must continue to exist after confirmation because the Chapter 13 trustee must have power to administer it; therefore the debtor's
wages up to amount of plan payments are estate property and protected by automatic stay of
§ 362); Mason v. Williams (In re Mason), 45 B.R. 498, 501 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984) (the estate no
longer exists after confirmation because property of the estate vests in debtor, unless specified
otherwise in plan; therefore, the automatic stay of § 362 does not protect debtor's post-confirmation wages from garnishment), afJfd 51 B.R. 548 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b), (c) (1988).
190. The educational loan non-dischargeability provision of Chapter 7, § 523(a)(8), was
made applicable to Chapter 13 cases in 1990. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 3007(b), 104 Stat. 1388-28, amended § 1328(a)(2) by adding a
reference to § 523(a)(8).
191. Three exceptions are part of the § 523(a) exceptions applicable to Chapter 7 debtors:
Spousal and child support, § 523(a)(5), educational loans, § 523(a)(8), and personal injuries
resulting from drunk driving, § 523(a)(9). Missing from Chapter 13's exceptions are, for example, fraudulent claims, embezzlement, and willful and malicious injury.
192. I1U.S.C. § 1328(a)(I) (Supp. It1990).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1990). This section is in the Chapter 13 provisions,
rather than the Chapter 7 provisions, because Kelly found that § 523(a)(7) applied in a Chapter 7 case. Because § 523(a)(7) presumably could not be applicable to a Chapter 13 case,
Congress inserted the amendment in the Chapter 13 provisions of § 1328.
194. Furthermore, a Chapter 13 debtor can get another discharge in less than six years if
the plan is successful, unlike a Chapter 7 debtor, who is barred from receiving another discharge within six years. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (1988). Some debtors thus take advantage of
what is known as a Chapter "20": The debtor files Chapter 13 shortly after receiving a Chapter 7 discharge to capture those debts not discharged by Chapter 7. See, e.g., Downey Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Metz (In re Metz), 67 B.R. 462, 465 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that "Chapter
20" debtor obtains advantages of both Chapter 7 and 13 without suffering their disadvantages:
lebtor obtains "super discharge" of Chapter 13, retains property, but since debtor obtained
)rior discharge in Chapter 7 of unsecured debts, debtor's Chapter 13 plan may in effect be a
ero-payment plan); Helbock v. Strause (In re Strause), 97 B.R. 22, 29 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)
lebtor who has received Chapter 7 discharge not precluded from filing Chapter 13 case even
iough Chapter 7 case is still pending); William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal
'hapter13?, 65 IND. L. J.85, 98 (1989).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
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whether the debtor's inability to complete the plan is due to circum-

stances beyond her control and whether creditors have received a liquidation amount. 196 The hardship discharge, however, is in essence a
Chapter 7 discharge, because the Chapter 7 discharge exceptions of § 523
apply. 197

Chapter 13's broader discharge may be based on moral considerations, because the debtor's efforts to repay out of her future earnings
rather than her current and, most likely, limited assets are more laudatory. Lawyers and legislators are concerned that many debtors who are
capable of repaying some or all of their debts nevertheless resort to Chapter 7.198 By granting a broader discharge in Chapter 13, the Bankruptcy

Code encourages repayment. Chapter 13 also provides the debtor with

an opportunity to salvage her moral worth by repaying creditors. 199

Given the broader discharge of Chapter 13, the discharge exception of
criminal restitution under § 1328(a)(3) may be inconsistent with these

policies. 2°0

196. Section 1328(b) reads:
(b) At any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and hearing,
the court may grant a discharge to a debtor who has not completed payments under
the plan only if(1) the debtor's faliure to complete such payments is due to circumstances for
which the debtor should not justly be held accountable;
(2) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property actually distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the
amount that would have been paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor had been
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date; and
(3) modification of the plan under section 1329 of this title is not practicable.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1988).
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c)(2) (1988). At least one commentator suggests this provision reflects a pro-creditor bias. Van Baalen, supra note 153, at 494 n.210.
198. Howard, supra note 41, at 1082-83. As one court noted, it is "not the design of the
Bankruptcy laws to allow the Debtor to lead the life of Riley while his creditors suffer on his
behalf." In re Bryant, 47 B.R. 21, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984). Criticism of the discharge
granted in the consumer chapters prior to the 1984 BAFJA amendments focused on two
points. First, access to Chapter 7 was too easy; there were too many debtors who could fund a
plan under Chapter 13 but who instead opted for Chapter 7. This resulted in a credit industry
drive for a "mandatory" Chapter 13. Whitford, supra note 194, at 90. Second, those debtors
who had opted for Chapter 13 were not paying as much as they could under their plans.
Corish & Herbert, supra note 183, at 50. BAFJA addressed these problems by instituting the
"substantial abuse" dismissal provisions for Chapter 7 in § 707(b) and the "disposable income" requirement of Chapter 13 plans in § 1325(b)(1)(B). Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 312, 317, 98 Stat. 333, 355, 356.
199. But see Whitford, supra note 194, at 95-96 (fact that debtor repays some debts unde
Chapter 13 does not necessarily remove moral stigma of bankruptcy).
200. These inconsistencies and a possible solution are discussed more fully infra in Pail
1I.D and V, respectively.
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Exceptions to Discharge: Chapters 7 and 13

(1) Policy Basisfor Exceptions to Discharge

The various exceptions to Chapter 7 discharge0 1 are of two basic
types, procedural and substantive. Procedural exceptions are based on
the debtor's abuse of and failure to comply with the orderly administration of her bankruptcy case, and substantive exceptions are those which
do not fit into the category of those debts owed by the "honest"
debtor.20 2 These limitations are based on the dangers inherent in a too
freely available discharge. If bankruptcy discharge had no cost to the
debtor, the economic laws of supply and demand would dictate that
debtors habitually and frequently resort to bankruptcy. 20 3 Undue disruptions to the credit market would result, because the cost of credit
would rise, making it more difficult to obtain.2°4 Thus, giving up either
property or future income is not sufficient; further filters on the debtor's
conduct are required to preserve the integrity of the system.
The first group of discharge exceptions addresses procedural defects.
Exceptions to discharge will result from the debtor's failure to comply
with asset scheduling requirements, 20 5 failure to keep adequate books
and records, 20 6 refusal to obey court orders or to testify, 20 7 and receipt of
a Chapter 7 discharge within the previous six years. 20 8 This group of
201. This section includes those discharge exceptions that apply to the "hardship" Chapter 13 discharge as well. As noted above in Part II.C.2, the Chapter 13 debtor has only five
discharge limitations unless she fails to complete her plan: alimony and child support payments, restitution obligations, long-term payments under the plan, personal injury damages
resulting from drunk driving, and educational loans.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1988) (money, property, etc. obtained by false pretenses); Id.
§ 523(a)(4) (fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity); Id. § 523(a)(6) (willful
or malicious injury by the debtor to another); Id. § 523(a)(9) (Supp. 11 1990) (death or personal injury resulting from drunk driving).
203. The limits on the availability of discharge, most notably the six-year bar, have the
most direct effect of preventing overuse. Nonetheless, non-legal constraints exist, such as the
moral stigma still attached to bankruptcy. See supra Part II.B. Indeed, studies indicate that
only 4% of debtors are repeaters. Girth, supra note 142, at 24.
204. Jackson, supra note 66, at 1427 ("free access to discharge would be disastrous for a
credit-based economy"); see also supra Part II.B.
205. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988). This section lists the debtor's duties while in bankruptcy
proceedings. The debtor must file a list of creditors, assets and liabilities, and generally cooperate with the trustee by surrendering books, records and other information, and appear at the
meeting of creditors. Id.
206. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (1988). This, of course, also has an element of fraud or intent
to hinder and delay creditors; this kind of "moral" as opposed to "procedural" misbehavior is
discussed as part of the second group of exceptions.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (1988). Again, this exception has moral overtones.
208. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (1988). This exception is not a blanket prohibition, however,
because the debtor may be able to obtain another discharge if, among other things, her unsecured creditors receive 100% of their allowed claims or in the case of Chapter 13 if the plan
is proposed in "good faith" or represents the debtor's "best efforts." 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)(A)(B) (1988). For a discussion of these standards, see supra note 183.
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exceptions probably traces its roots to the notion of discharge as a concession made to the debtor in return for submitting to the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction to make distributions to creditors. 20 9 To acheive fairness, bankruptcy should not be available to those who would seek to circumvent its processes. And as a practical matter, smooth administration
of the crowded bankruptcy dockets requires that the courts not be burdened with recalcitrant debtors.
The second group of exceptions has substantive moral overtones.
Taxes, 2 10 educational loans, 211 willful and malicious injury,2 12 fines and
penalties, 21 3 and alimony and child support 21 4 fall within this second
group. Debts based on filing a false financial statement with a creditor 21 5
or resulting from debtor conduct that hinders, delays, or defrauds creditors2 16 are also barred from discharge. These exceptions are policy-based
and are rooted in the notion that relief should only be granted to the
"honest" but overburdened debtor, not those seeking to get out of fraud21 7
ulently obtained debts they are morally obliged to repay.
The moral obligation inherent in this category of exceptions encompasses the duty to pay "involuntary" creditors, such as those whose
claims are based on willful or malicious injury and those claiming alimony and child support, because these are not contract claims made at
209. The debtor's participation in the collection proceedings afforded by bankruptcy can
be viewed as the price tag for the discharge granted the debtor. Hillman, supra note 115, at
120.
210. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1988). Governments' entitlement to priority in payment over
other creditors is probably not based on fairness (governments as "deep pockets" are probably
the least hurt by non-payment) but rather on the notion of enforcing a civic duty. Some commentators, however, believe taxes should be dischargeable, since their non-dischargeability is
an impediment to the debtor's return to economic health. See Howard, supra note 41, at 1071.
211. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. 11 1990). There is an undue hardship exception to the
non-dischargeability of educational loans. However, the undue hardship standard has been
strictly applied. TREISTER, supra note 95, at 325. See infra Part II.D.2 for a more detailed
discussion of educational loans.
212. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988) (covering intentional torts).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988). This has been interpreted to include criminal restitution obligations in a Chapter 7 case. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1986). See discussion infra Part V.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988). Even religious tithe is disfavored, although not through
the method of exception to discharge: In a Chapter 13 case, it is not considered part of the
debtor's necessary living expenses, but part of disposable income; thus the debtor must forego
tithe in order to confirm the plan. See generally Bruce E. Kosub & Susan K. Thompson, Note,
The Religious Debtor's Conviction to Tithe as the Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 873 (1988) (discussing the courts' interpretations of the ability-to-pay test and its possible
conflicts with the first amendment).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1988).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988).
217. See Hallinan, supra note 29, at 138 ("[I]t is not difficult to suggest a moral basis for
the non-dischargeability of fraud and malicious injury claims, given the existence of widely
held standards regarding the ethical status of the conduct involved.").
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arm's length as are those made with the debtor's consumer creditors. In
addition, the non-dischargeability of obligations such as alimony and
child support prevents social externalities that result from placing the
debtor's dependents on the social welfare rolls. Prohibitions against such
socially undesirable conduct as failing to pay alimony or child support in
the bankruptcy context may help to deter such conduct. 21 8 This channeling function can also have more benign, but positive, economic effects
because it streamlines the lending process by reducing information costs.
Lenders need not worry about the moral character of consumer borrowers because if fraudulently obtained debts are non-dischargeable, lenders
are instead free to concentrate on borrowers' financial ability, information which is easily obtained from credit agencies. 2 19
While the first group of procedural exceptions is not subject to much
debate, the second group of exceptions based on morally culpable conduct (particularly the lack of exceptions applicable to Chapter 13 cases)
is hotly contested. 220 Thus, in recent years, Congress has been restricting
the scope of the discharge available to both Chapter 7 and 13 debtors.
These new limitations reflect a return to the focus of bankruptcy as a
debt collection device-debt repayment being morally desirable. The
1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code2 21 contained provisions that
resulted from the debate over whether Chapter 7 should be available only
to those debtors who did not qualify for Chapter 13.222 Limiting Chapter
7 to those whose future income would be insufficient to fund a Chapter
13 plan reflects the residual emphasis of bankruptcy as a collection device: because Chapter 13 requires debtors to repay some or all of their
debts, it should be the morally favored avenue of bankruptcy relief. A
Chapter 13 requirement ultimately was not included in the 1984 Amendments, but the standards for Chapter 13 plans were tightened to avoid
the problem of the zero-payment plan debtors who were seeking the

broader discharge of Chapter

13.223

Chapter 7 cases are also now policed by the "substantial abuse"
standard: the court may on its own motion dismiss a Chapter 7 case if it
is a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy process. 224 The substantial abuse
218. Jackson, supra note 66, at 1441.
219. Howard, supra note 41, at 1070.
220. See ag., Hallinan, supra note 29, at 138 ("These fault-based liabilities are not, however, entirely excepted from discharge.., they remain fully dischargeable in Chapter 13 cases.
From the perspective of moral explanations, this difference in treatment is anomalous, since
the blameworthiness of the conduct creating the liability is presumably the same in either
[Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 cases].").
221. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); see supra notes 101, 198.
222. Hallinan, supra note 29, at 150.
223. Chapter 13 plans must conform to the "good faith" and "best efforts" standards discussed supra in note 183.
224. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988). Section 707(b) reads: "the court... may dismiss a case
filed by an individual debtor under [Chapter 7] whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it
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doctrine is tied to the campaign for mandatory Chapter 13 cases, because
one of the standards for determining whether Chapter 7 may be employed without constituting substantial abuse is whether the debtor could
have filed Chapter 13.225 Thus, "abuse" under § 707(b), if founded on an
ability to repay debts, is based on a moral conviction that debts should be
repaid. This conviction seems out of step with the broad discharge policy
of bankruptcy, because modem bankruptcy theoretically does not consider ability to repay as a condition of discharge.
The emergence of these policing doctrines in recent years reflects the
ebb and flow of bankruptcy's two competing objectives: creditor payment and debtor discharge. After the expansion of discharge by the
Code in 1978, and its subsequent manipulation by debtors, Congress
sought both to restrict access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy through the substantial abuse doctrine and to curb misuse of Chapter 13 plans with the
"good faith standard." These efforts at reaching a compromise between
the twin goals of creditor collection and debtor discharge presage Congress' amendment to § 1328(a), although this amendment is more of an
absolute, not a mediation of values between discharge and restitution.
(2) The EducationalLoan Example
The "hardship" exception for debts based on educational loans is a
good example of careful balancing of the competing creditor payment
and debtor discharge policies of bankruptcy. Although educational loans
are excepted from discharge,2 2 6 the hardship exception allows courts to
finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter."
However, § 707(b) also provides that "[t]here shall be a presumption in favor of granting the
relief [discharge] requested by the debtor."
225. This is evidenced by the required income and expense statements in Chapter 7 cases.
BANKR. R. 1007(b)(1); Hallinan, supra note 29, at 150 (The income and expense statement
"would appear to have no other use if it were not intended as the basis for a section 707(b)
inquiry."). Courts, however, do not agree on the relevance of the debtor's potential ability to
fund a plan to a finding of substantial abuse. See Zolog v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908,
914 (9th Cir. 1988) (debtor's ability to pay her debts is the primary criteria for finding of
substantial abuse); In re Strong, 84 B.R. 541, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (most important
indicator of substantial abuse is whether debtor has enough disposable income to propose a
Chapter 13 plan). But see In re Krohn, 87 B.R. 926, 928 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (substantial
abuse existed even though debtor incapable of proposing Chapter 13 plan), aft'd, 886 F.2d 123
(6th Cir. 1989).
226. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. 111990). The exception for educational loans was based
on Congress' fear that widespread discharge of student loans would endanger their continued
viability:
This amendment [§ 523(a)(8)] to the Code was adopted in light of testimony that the
bankruptcy rate involving student loans had increased significantly and that in some
areas of the country, students were being counseled on filing for bankruptcy to discharge their obligations to repay guaranteed student loans. It was felt by some members of Congress that the amendment was necessary to prevent the rise in the default
rate on student loans from jeopardizing the student loan program altogether.
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make allowances for debtors' good faith efforts at repayment and to consider their circumstances in deciding whether to grant a discharge of an
educational loan. 227 Thus, a discharge may be granted if the debtor
meets the "conditions" specified by the section. Unlike the presumption
in favor of discharging debts, if the Bankruptcy Code categorizes a debt
as non-dischargeable, the burden is on the debtor
to demonstrate the
228
condition meriting application of the exception.
Section 523(a)(8) provides that educational loans are non-dischargeable unless the debtor can show "undue" hardship or that the loan first
229
became due seven years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
The second exception, a bright-line test, embodies the policy that aged
debts have most likely been partially paid, and that the debtor has not
filed bankruptcy merely to escape from student loans. 230 Discharging
student loans under the second exception will not impair Congress' attempts to prevent abuses of the bankruptcy process and also harmonizes
with the fresh start policy in granting these "honest" debtors relief.
D'Ettore v. Devry Inst. of Technology (In re D'Ettore), 106 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14 (1976)).
227. Educational loans may also be singled out for special treatment because "[u]nlike
most commercial loans which are granted only upon a showing of creditworthiness and ability
to make repayment.., student loans... are granted only upon a debtor establishing need....
[These] loans do not require.., repayment until the borrower has completed his or her education." State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Johnson, 43 B.R. 1016, 1021 (E.D. Va. 1984).
228. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Webb (In re Webb), 132 B.R. 199, 201 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)
(In a complaint to determine non-dischargeability, once existence of the debt has been shown
by the creditor, "[t]he burden then shifts to the Debtor to prove 'undue hardship.' ").
229. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. 11 1990) provides that:
(a) A discharge under... this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt(8) for an educational ... loan [made by a governmental unit or non-profit
institution], unless(A) such loan... first became due more than 7 years ... before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents ....
230. Discharging a student loan less than seven years old is designed to curb an "abuse[] of
the bankruptcy laws by debtors with large amounts of educational loans, few other debts, and
well-paying jobs, who have filed bankruptcy shortly after leaving school and before any loans
became due ....
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6094. "This... indicates a Congressional policy of excepting discharge in
those inequitable situations where Debtors with superior education and employment skills
were intentionally abusing the fresh start policies afforded by the bankruptcy laws." Correll v.
Union Nat'l Bank (In re Correll), 105 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); see also State
Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Johnson, 43 B.R. 1016, 1021 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) ("It is... most
questionable when a debtor accepts a student loan and then, prior to its maturity, attempts to
extinguish the debt in bankruptcy without ever making an attempt to repay it. It stretches
credulity to say that the debtor has made an honest effort to pay these debts as required by 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).") (emphasis added).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

The first exception is more equitable and subject to judicial interpretation. 231 "Garden variety" 232 hardship, however, is not enough; courts
examine claims of hardship on a case-by-case basis233 and apply stringent
standards. 234 The test varies by circuit, but some factors considered include good faith, policy considerations, and the debtor's current financial
condition. 235 These categories overlap, as each qualifies the other. For
example, the debtor's financial condition will bear on good faith efforts (a
high-income as opposed to a low-income debtor who has made no pay236
ments); and the policy considerations reflecting the "fresh start" ideal

require an honest debtor (which again will require consideration of payments made in relation to income level). Nonetheless, the tests fashioned
by courts indicate a willingness to balance equitable factors on a case-bycase basis, a difficult task. By eschewing a bright-line test, courts are
more willing to get involved in the analysis of debtors' conditions. Such
an involvement indicates a willingness to preserve the fresh start ideal
even if it involves the dedication of more judicial resources.
If educational loans can merit judicial discretion and weighing, why
not criminal restitution? The stricter discharge standards for educational
231. See Evans v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Evans), 131 B.R. 372, 374-75
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
232. D'Ettore v. Devry Inst. of Technology (In re D'Ettore), 106 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1989).
233. Id. Some courts have specifically rejected attempts to "inject an 'element of objectivity' into the calculus," refusing to employ bright-line tests such as weighing the debtor's income against federal poverty guidelines, and instead using a "fact-sensitive inquiry into the
unique facts and circumstances of each bankruptcy case." Evans v. Higher Educ. Assistance
Found. (In re Evans), 131 B.R. 372, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
234. "The statute refers to undue hardship and the mere fact that repayment of an educational loan imposes a hardship is insufficient to permit discharge of the loan .... '[Most or
possibly all debtors could make a "garden variety" hardship claim' .....

As a result, bank-

ruptcy courts have narrowly construed [the exception]." Foreman v. Higher Educ. Assistance
Found. (In re Foreman), 119 B.R. 584, 587 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (quoting D'Ettore, 106
B.R. at 718) (emphases in original).
235. See Evans v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Evans), 131 B.R. 372, 375
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991). The Evans court followed a three-part test, representative of factors
considered by most bankruptcy courts, consisting of: (1) a "mechanical test" involving inquiry
into the debtor's current employment and income, educational level, work skills, and family
support responsibilities; (2) a "good faith test" whereby the court determines whether the
debtor "is making a strenuous effort to maximize her personal income within the practical
limitations of her vocational profile"; and (3) a "policy test," which considers whether discharge would further the congressional policy behind § 523(a)(8)(B). Id. The policy test considers whether discharge would be an abuse of the bankruptcy process, considering factors
similar to those enunciated in the legislative history. H.R. REP.No. 959, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
133 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6094. See also Cadle Co. v. Webb (In re
Webb), 132 B.R. 199, 201-02 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); Clinton v. Great Lakes Higher Educ.
Corp. (In re Clinton), 133 B.R. 96, 97-98 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
236. "As for the policy test, courts have stated repeatedly that the Bankruptcy Code is
primarily designed to give the honest debtor a fresh start in life." Evans v. Higher Educ.
Assistance Found. (In re Evans), 131 B.R. 372, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
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loans represent a congressional policy to prevent bankruptcy from being
used as a stepping-stone for those in a career path who could repay their
loans.2 37 However, there is the "hardship" exception for those whose
financial situation has taken a turn for the worse and merit the benefit of
a full discharge. Although criminal restitution obligations represent, at a
minimal level, a creditor-type relationship with an involuntary creditor,
they also represent the judgment of the state. Thus, while they may not
be the same footing morally as educational loans, they present the same
type of financial scenario: the debtor's fresh start provided by bankruptcy is impaired. Also, many of the criminal restitution statutes themselves provide for a "discharge" of the obligation-and may provide
complete exoneration or substitution of a non-monetary penalty if the
offender's inability to pay is not an act of bad faith. 238 If the criminal
justice system can award relief, bankruptcy discharge of restitutive obligations in the proper situation would not be anomalous with the purposes of criminal restitution. Finally, certain tort judgments are
dischargeable,239 even though they are also involuntary creditor relationships. Fitting restitution into a similar "hardship" discharge scheme can
be consistent with both the aims of restitution and bankruptcy discharge.
The educational loan exception looks more like the kind of balancing done in the modern English system of bankruptcy, which grants few
unconditional discharges. Though the fresh start policy disdains the conditional discharge, an examination of the English system, which uses
conditional discharges, can shed some light on how to approach potential
solutions to the criminal restitution/bankruptcy discharge stalemate.
(3) Discharge in the Modern English System: Suspended, Limited, and
ConditionalDischarges
The American system of bankruptcy theoretically does not condition the entitlement to discharge on ability to pay. Instead, bankruptcy
courts use non-economic (moral and procedural) devices to filter out
those debtors who, by their conduct, should not be entitled to general
discharge or the discharge of a particular debt.24° In that sense it is "unconditional": it is not conditioned on ability to pay. Discharge is a priori the debtor's entitlement; the presumption in favor of discharge is only
taken away where it is shown that the debtor's conduct requires that her
debts not be discharged. 241 The English system, by contrast, conditions
the availability of discharge on some effort to pay.
237.
1989).
238.
239.
excepts
240.
241.

See Correll v. Union Nat'l Bank (In re Correll), 105 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
See infra Part III and notes 298-300.
Negligence claims are not excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523, which only
tort judgments based on "willful or malicious injury." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
See supra Part II.C.2.
Discharge will be granted to a debtor unless some objection is made either to her
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The English system uses suspended and conditional discharges to
control debtors' potential abuse of the bankruptcy system. A suspended
discharge is one in which the court withholds the effectiveness of discharge temporarily in response to some undesirable conduct by the
debtor. 242 A conditional discharge is one in which the court conditions
the discharge on payment of some portion of the debtor's obligations.
The English conditional discharge looks something like a Chapter 13 discharge, because the debtor must pay "such balance or part of any balance
of the debts.., out of the future earnings or after-acquired property of
the bankrupt." 243 The English system uses a set of "facts" (debtor misconduct) to determine what sort of discharge should be granted. Some
usual "facts" found in English bankruptcy proceedings are: assets equal
to less than 50% of liabilities, failure to keep adequate books and
records, "hazardous speculation,....
unjustifiable extravagance in living
...gambling, or... culpable neglect of his business affairs."' 244 While in
American bankruptcy courts similar misbehavior (such as failure to keep
books and records) can lead to denial of discharge, the English system is
less rigid, with the presence of special facts leading to the less harsh sanc245
tions of suspended or conditional discharge.
In England an unconditional discharge is the exception to the
rule. 24 6 The English rules reflect more of an emphasis on creditor collection remedies than does American law. 247 The English debtor does not
have an option whether or not to repay her debts, as does a debtor who
opts for Chapter 7 liquidation. Further, the failure to pay debts in the
English system will result in the denial of discharge, while a Chapter 13
debtor who does not meet her plan payments may be granted a "hardship
discharge. ' 248 Although it has been recommended at various times, the
American bankruptcy courts have only adopted the conditional discharge in very limited circumstances, 2 49 because it is considered too pudischarge generally, 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1) (1988), or to the dischargeability of a particular
debt, 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1990). See also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) (presumption
in favor of granting debtor discharge).
242. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26(2) (Eng.), amended by Bankruptcy
(Amendment) Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 7, § 1 (Eng.), amended by Criminal Law Act,
1967, ch. 58, § 10(2), sched. 3, Pt. III (Eng.), amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, §§ 6,
8(9) (Eng.).
243. Id.
244. Id. at § 26(3).
245. Boshkoff, supra note 28, at 85.

246. Id. at 87.
247. Id. at 77.
248. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. 11 1990), providing for a limited dischargeability of
student loans if hardship circumstances exist. An inquiry into the debtor's ability to pay is
required here to determine if such hardship exists. See supra Part II.D.2.
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nitive and would hamper the debtor's return to full participation in the
250
credit economy.
The English system relies heavily on judicial discretion in determining what kind of discharge to grant the debtor. Because English bankruptcy appellate decisions are rare, and the trial courts do not publish
decisions, it is difficult to determine what factors judges consider.2 51
However, courts generally look at the debtor's "suitability to recommence trading; whether the creditors have been enabled to recover all
that might reasonably be made forthcoming to them through the bankruptcy; and the essential consideration of the proper protection of the
public. ' 252 The courts consider rehabilitative factors in addition to creditor collection success, and some253
prophylactic effect on excessive future
spending is considered desirable.
Given the substantial concern in the United States over debtors who
could pay under Chapter 13 but do not, conditional or suspended discharges appear to be good solutions to problems that arise with particular debts. However, considering the current all or nothing approach to
most debts, discharge policy seems to do little balancing internally. Certain debts that might be discharged are not because to do so requires that
the court consider prohibited factors, such as ability to pay. However,
there is evidence in the Bankruptcy Code of a more creative approach to
discharge. When considering a Chapter 13 debtor's plan and whether a
hardship discharge applies, or in the case of educational loans, the bankruptcy court will consider ability to pay and balance equitable factors,
including efforts at repayment. The gatekeeper doctrines of "good
faith," "best efforts," and "substantial abuse," which attempt to police
the bankruptcy process to prevent abuse by unscrupulous debtors, provide sufficient obstacles to prevent exploitation of discharge. On the
other hand, the current use of "conditional discharges"-which place the
burden of demonstrating entitlement to discharge on the debtor-shows
that some debts merit a closer examination by bankruptcy courts. In the
case of a criminal restitutive obligation, such controls might be applied to
make the discharge process more flexible.
250.

"Punishing debtor dishonesty and incompetence by such disabilities as 'conditional

discharge' or 'undischarged status' ....

is not appropriate.... These sanctions have the effect

of placing legal restraints on the debtor's renewed participation in the open credit economy.... Thus they are also incompatible with the fresh start policy that aims to support the
goals of the open credit economy." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 83. See also S.
Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 99 (1933) (proposed suspension provision which drew heavily on English and Canadian misconduct standard).
251. Boshkoff, supra note 28, at 91.
252. Id. at 90 (quoting I.F. FLETCHER, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 289-90 (1978)).
253. Id. at 93 ("[lIt may... be... that the mere fact of having undergone the somewhat
traumatic experience of bankruptcy is itself a sufficiently sharp lesson to ensure that the individual will be more careful in the future.") (quoting BANKER (LONDON), Aug. 1977, at 13940).
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III. Criminal Restitution
Restitution to the victims of crimes is now a common fixture in the
criminal justice systems of the fifty states. 25 4 As an alternative to the
traditional punishment of incarceration, restitution keeps criminal offenders both usefully employed and out of overcrowded prisons.255 Restitution represents a compromise between the harsh sanction of
imprisonment, in which prisoners are often subject to abuse and overcrowded conditions, and probation, which is often no punishment at
25 6
all.
Restitution is an ancient penalty 257 that became incorporated into
civil law as Anglo-American law was divided into the two familiar
branches of civil and criminal law. 25 8 Restitution in the criminal sphere
developed in conjunction with probation, 2 59 and its use has flourished.
Restitution is said to serve the dual purposes of rehabilitating the criminal and compensating the victim,2 6° although the former is often stressed

as its primary purpose. 26 1 States vary widely in their implementation of
restitution, but some common themes emerge, generally reflecting
254. Thirty states require that restitution be considered in imposing criminal sanctions.
They are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indi-

ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Lisa A. Upson, Note,
CriminalRestitution as a Limited Opportunity, 13 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 243 n.9 (1987) (citing NATIONAL ORG. FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, VICTIM RIGHTS AND SERVICE: A LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY 15 (1985)).
255. The implementation and definition of restitution varies widely from state to state.
This is because restitution has many aspects, including procedures, purposes, offenses for
which it is used, and categories of eligible recipients. This Note explores the most common
statutes as a backdrop against which to address their dischargeability in bankruptcy. See generally Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime:Assessing the Role of the
Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52 (1982) (assessing the basis for support in theory and in
lav for the use of restitutive sanctions, and documenting the operational constraints placed
upon the use of criminal restitution).
256. Note, supra note 3, at 932.
257. Id. at 933 n.18 (noting that ancient English, Greek, and Roman law, and the Torah
contained provisions for repayment to crime victims).
258. Id. at 933-34.
259. Harland, supra note 255, at 57. However, restitution can also be imposed in connection with or instead of incarceration. See Upson, supra note 254, at 245.
260. See People v. Walmsley, 168 Cal. App. 3d 636, 639, 214 Cal. Rptr. 170, 171 (1985)
("[r]estitution as a condition of probation is favored by public policy both as a means of doing
justice to the victim ....

and for rehabilitation of the offender.") (citations omitted).

261. Note, supra note 3, at 937; see also United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982) ("In fact, though, while recompense to the victim is a usually laudable
consequence of restitution, the focus of any probation regimen is on the offender. The order of
probation is 'an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment... intended as a reforming discipline.' ") (quoting Koramatsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943) (quoting
Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937))) (omission by court).
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choices about the state's purpose in imposing restitution, the defendant's
ability to pay, the loss to the victim, the rehabilitative value of restitution,
and the type of crime committed. Section A of this part traces the historical origins of restitution and its development as a criminal sentence, and
the various policies behind restitution and its current position in the
criminal justice system. Section B examines the practical aspects of restitution and how it is implemented by various court systems.
A.

Background

Originally, early justice systems made no procedural distinction between what we now know as "civil" and "criminal" wrongs. 2 62 Crimes
were viewed as a private matter and not an offense against the state,
although some crimes were classed as "public wrongs," in which the
community interest in seeing the offender punished superseded the individual's private interest in recompense or retribution. 263 Restitution was
the punishment used to remedy these private wrongs; the offender was
required to reimburse the victim for the damage caused by the offense. 264
As societies came to rely on an institutional hierarchy for their governance, the public interest in seeing wrongs redressed began to dominate
the private interest. 265 When the public interest in redressing criminal
acts overtook the private interest, punishment in the form of incarceration took the place of restitutionary payments to the victim. 266 Restitution remained available as a remedy in private, or "civil" wrongs, 267 and
took on a more limited role in the criminal justice system.
Restitution's use in the American criminal system traces its origins
to the first uses of probationary sentences in the 1800s. 2 68 Today, restitution is firmly embedded in the criminal justice system, although not without some controversy. Critics of restitution believe that because it
compensates the victim, restitution redresses a private, not a public,
wrong and thus breaches the separation of the criminal and civil
branches of law. 269 Such critics overlook the fact that it is restitution's
262.

Harland, supra note 255, at 52; cf Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, CriminalLaw, and

the Ideology of Individuality,77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 981 (1986) (Restitutionary
theory of justice-the belief that the " 'natural' response to offensive behavior" is repayment to
victims-is based on assertions that inter alia, "pre-feudal societies treated all instances of
harm as a private matter and made no distinction between criminal and civil remedies"; in fact
primitive societies did have "public wrongs.").
263. Id. at 986-87.
264. Note, supra note 3, at 933.
265. Boldt, supra note 262, at 981 (The "substitution of sovereign's interest for private
interest of victim... [was accompanied] by division of law into civil and criminal spheres.");
Note, supra note 3, at 932-33.
266. Boldt, supra note 262, at 981; Note, supra note 3, at 933-34.
267. Note, supra note 3, at 933-34.
268. Harland, supra note 255, at 57.
269. However, some noteworthy legal commentators believe the distinction between civil
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characteristic as an alternative form of punishment that gives it the civil
overtones. Further, its use can be seen as an enhancement to other penal
sanctions, because by preventing private retribution (by literally making
the offender pay for her crime) it leaves criminal sanctions with the
courts and promotes their aims of being the primary redressers of such
270
public wrongs.
In its simplest form, restitution consists of returning stolen property
to its rightful owner, usually after it has been used as evidence. 27 1 This
most closely resembles contract law restitution, and is more properly designated "restoration. '272 The most common form of criminal law restitution is payment of the damaged or stolen property's value or
compensation for services rendered but unpaid. 273 Some courts distinguish restitution from reparation, the former being the "fruits of the of' 2 74
fense" and the latter "an amount the defendant can afford to pay.
Restitution as an alternative to imprisonment accomplishes many of
the penal system's goals. Incarceration protects the public from commission of crimes by isolating the offender, deters future criminal acts, and
rehabilitates the offender. 275 Restitution in conjunction with probation
can accomplish the objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation with the
added benefit of compensating the victim. Any form of punishment has
some deterrent effect, unless the offender views the benefits of the act
committed as greater than the penalty.276 Rehabilitation is accomplished
through the positive psychological contribution that repayment affords
the offender. Thus, as an alternative sentence, restitution serves the goals
of the penal system without straining its resources.
Restitution's value as a rehabilitative device has several facets. It
allows the offender to make amends psychologically, which may contriband criminal law is spurious. Jeremy Bentham maintained "[t]hat no settled line can be drawn
between the civil branch and the penal is most manifest." JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 289-98 (1945). But cf 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*2 (wrongs divided into two types, one private and one public). See also Note, supra note 3, at
935 (commenting that critics of restitution rely on the distinction between the goals of criminal
and civil law). This Note does not intend to focus on whether restitution has a proper place in
the criminal justice system, but instead will focus on the role it plays and the important purposes restitution serves.
270. Note, supra note 3, at 936-37.
271. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.061 (West 1976) (rightful owner of money or motor
vehicles may obtain return of same).
272. Harland, supra note 255, at 61.
273. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(d) (Supp. 1991).
274. Harland, supra note 255, at 63 (citing People v. Lofton, 78 Misc. 2d 202, 356
N.Y.S.2d 791 (Crim. Ct. 1974)). In this Note, "restitution" will refer to any order by the
criminal court for the payment of money by the offender for the harm suffered by the victim.
275. Upson, supra note 254, at 245.
276. POSNER, supra note 5, at 206 (suggesting that criminals are "rational calculators"
and measure benefits of criminal activity against foregone opportunities, likelihood of apprehension, and severity of punishment).
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ute to her self-esteem and enable her to embrace the values necessary to
ensure that she adapts properly to society and does not become a repeat
offender. 277 Restitution further counters anti-social behavior by making
the offender aware that she has injured another person. 278 By mirroring
can conthe societal norms of responsibility and reciprocity, restitution
279
form the offender's future behavior to desirable goals.
B. Implementation
In imposing a restitution order, the sentencing judge considers many
factors before deciding to impose restitution and determining the appropriate amount. Courts primarily consider restitution most appropriate
for non-violent crimes. Violent criminals need to be isolated from the
public, and restitution does not serve this function. 280 Furthermore, prisons have become a limited resource, and in order to put them to their
best use, they are reserved for repeat offenders or criminals with a violent
propensity. 28 1 Therefore, restitution is often tied to probation; if the
restitutionary payments are not made, the terms of probation are
282
violated.
Courts disagree over allowable amounts of restitution. Generally,
restitution is tied to the amount of the victim's loss. 283 Because restitution has a punitive aspect, however, it often may exceed the victim's
loss. 284 Further, if there is difficulty in measuring the loss, restitution
277. Jacob, supra note 3, at 156-57.
278. Laster, supra note 30, at 80. In Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 403
(1978), the court noted:

Restitution can aid an offender's rehabilitation by strengthening the individual's
sense of responsibility. The probationer may learn to consider more carefully the
consequences of his or her actions. One who successfully makes restitution should
have a positive sense of having earned a fresh start and will have tangible evidence of
his or her capacity to alter old behavior patterns and lead a law-abiding life.
Id. at 798, 266 N.W.2d at 407.
279.

William P. Jacobson, Note, Use of Restitution in the Criminal Process: People v.

Miller, 16 UCLA L. REv. 456, 456-57 (1969).
280. Upson, supra note 254, at 246.
281.

Id. at 246-47.

282. See, eg.,

ALASKA STAT. §

12.55.051(a) (1990) (default in payment results in incarcer-

ation). This Note focuses primarily on restitution as a condition of probation in the context of
the bankruptcy discharge; therefore, other uses of restitution are not discussed.
283. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1)(a) (West Supp. 1992) provides "the court shall order

the defendant to make restitution to the victim for damage or loss caused directly or indirectly
Florida's restitution statute also includes provisions for the
by the defendant's offense ....
payment of medical expenses and lost income. Id. § 775.089(2)(a)-(c). The Supreme Court in
Kelly v. Robinson noted that CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(9), which required the defendant

to "make restitution of the fruits of his offense... in an amount he can afford to pay.., for the
loss or damage caused thereby" did not "require imposition of restitution in the amount of the
harm caused. Instead, it provides for a flexible remedy tailored to the defendant's situation."
479 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1986).
284. Generally, the amount must be tied to the offense for which the defendant is con-
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need not be ruled out as punishment on that basis. 28 5 Nevertheless, most
courts require that the restitution amount ordered bear a "reasonable"
2 86
relation to the crime committed.
287
Courts also take into account other factors, such as ability to pay.
This can become important in the rehabilitative context, because an offender who is unable to pay an unreasonably high restitution sentence
may become discouraged, destitute, and resort to further crime. 28 8 Some
states require the court to consider such factors as the defendant's physical and mental health, age, education, employment, family circumstances, financial condition, and damage to the victim. 28 9 Courts may
also be empowered to adjust the restitution order. In Michigan, the
court must withdraw the restitution condition if payment is impossible or
victed. However, some courts have gone beyond this, most notably in the case of People v.
Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967), where the defendant was ordered to pay
restitution not only to the victim, but to other customers who suffered losses as a result of his
conduct. Cf ILL. REV. STAT. § 1005-5-6(c)(1) (1990) (in case of multiple defendants, victim
may not recover in excess of actual damages caused by defendants); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9937-3(1) (Supp. 1991) (restitution award may not exceed jurisdictional limit of imposing court).
See also Jacobson, supra note 279, at 457-59; Harland, supra note 255, at 84 n.196.
285. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030 (Baldwin 1990) (in lieu of monetary restitution court may order defendant to make restitution by working for or on behalf of victim).
286. See, eg., People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293
(1967) ("A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the
offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or
forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid."). Some courts allow restitution for pain and suffering.
See eg., State v. Morgan, 8 Wash. App. 189, 190, 504 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1973) (awarding
restitution to the victim of an assault pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 9.92.060(2)). Restitution payments may be made in installments or as a lump sum payment. See, e.g., ALAsKA
STAT. § 12.55.045(c) (1990) (restitution may be made within specified time period or in installments); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34.1 (d) (Michie 1991) (restitution may be paid in lump sum
or by periodic payments).
287. Harland, supra note 255, at 91-94. Harland notes that there are two schools of
thought on the relevance of ability to pay to the restitutionary sentence: (1) ability to pay
should only be considered when enforcing the obligation, not when it is imposed; and (2)
ability to pay is central to determining the amount of restitution to be imposed. Id.; cf
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045(a) (1990) (defendant presumed to have ability to pay restitution).
288. Harland, supra note 255, at 92 (27-year restitution term undermined petitioner's
sense of responsibility) (citing Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978)). See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(3)(b) (West Supp. 1992) (limiting time over which restitution
payments may be made); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34.1 (e) (1991) (limiting probation to four
years).
289. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(d) (Supp. 1991) ("IT]he court shall take into
consideration the resources of the defendant, including all real and personal property owned
by the defendant ...his ability to earn, his obligation to support dependents .... "); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-35-304(d) (1990) ("[IThe court shall consider the financial resources and
future ability of the defendant to pay .... "); cf ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(c) (Supp.
1991) (court shall not consider defendant's economic circumstances in fixing amount of
restitution).
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would constitute "undue hardship. ' 290 Nebraska will not order restitution if the victim was an aider or abettor of the crime, or if the loss to the
291
victim does not exceed ten percent of his or her net financial resources.
Alaska considers the potential burden restitution may place on the dependents of the defendant. 292 Courts thus consider the same factors in
enforcing restitution obligations that they do in granting hardship discharges. These factors reflect concerns that criminals and debtors not be
overburdened and the necessity that the welfare rolls be kept to a
2 93
minimum.
Restitution must be imposed by the sentencing court; it cannot be
entrusted to probation officers. 294 However, the clerk of the court or the
295
probation officer may collect and dispense the restitution payments. 296
Often restitution is administered through a victim's crime fund,
though in other cases the offender pays the victim directly.2 97 Failure to
make the required payments leads to default proceedings. If the defendant shows extreme hardship or an inability to pay, courts may modify the
order.298 However, in the absence of these factors, delinquency will re299
sult in imprisonment.
290. People v. LaPine, 63 Mich. App. 554, 558, 234 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1975).
291. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1822(1), (5) (1987).
292. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045(a)(3) (1990).
293. See supra Part II.B; MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-37-3(a)(c) (Supp. 1991) (court may consider rehabilitative effect of restitution in determining whether to impose).
294. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1)(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("[T]he court shall
order the defendant to make restitution to the victim .... ") (emphasis added).
295. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(11)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-8-34. 1(d) (Michie 1991) (payments may be made to clerk of sentencing court or probation

officer).
296. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT § 15B-23 (1991) (establishing a "Crime Victims Compensation Fund"). The amounts collected for such funds can be substantial. In 1990, for example, Ventura County, California, collected $1 million from criminals and made payments to
1,958 victims. Some of the funds went for victim compensation, which is not "restitution" in
the sense used in this Note. Hugo Marting, Collections Up for Crime Victim Fund, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1991, at BI.
297. See, eg., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 640(a)(3)(i) (1992). Often, the victim may enforce the restitution award as a civil judgment. See, ag., ALASKA STAT. § 12:55.05 1(a); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-810(c)(3).
298. Equal protection problems may result if inability to pay results in the revocation of
probation, because the state cannot convert the fine into a jail sentence based on the defendant's indigency. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970) ("[S]tatute permitting sentence
of both imprisonment and fine cannot be parlayed into a longer term of imprisonment than is
fixed by statute since to do so would be to accomplish indirectly.., that which cannot be done
directly."); Harland, supra note 255, at 112 n.342. However, there is no problem with the
prohibition on imprisonment for debt because restitution does not create a debtor/creditor
relationship. Id. at 114 n.342. Nevertheless, this ignores the practical result of revocation.
299. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.05(a) (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-810(B) (Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(4) (West 1992). Intentional default, or a reckless disregard
of the restitution order showing lack of good faith is usually required. See Harland, supra note
255 at 112, n.341.
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Some courts, however, avoid incarceration by converting the restitution into community service, particularly where the default is based on
inability to pay.300 This makes sense in light of the rehabilitative facet of
restitution. The prison environment is not conducive to developing the
social skills to be learned through the discipline of repaying one's debt,
and may instead cause further breakdown in the offender's mental state
such that upon release she will commit further crimes. Thus, in order to
further the rehabilitative goals of restitution, courts should avoid imprisoning those who cannot pay their restitutive obligations.
IV.

Federalism: State Criminal Law and Federal
Law

aDanruiptcy

The state aims of criminal rehabilitation and punishment and the
federal aims of bankruptcy discharge, although administered in separate
spheres, collide when a debtor who owes restitution files for bankruptcy
and seeks a discharge of the restitutive obligation. One way conflict is
minimized is through the doctrine of forbearance known as "abstention,"
under which the federal court avoids meddling in state court criminal
decisions absent compelling need.3 0 1 The concerns underlying the doctrine of federalism were cited by the Supreme Court in both Kelly v.
Robinson302 and Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport.30 3 Federalism played a pivotal role in the Kelly decision and undoubtedly influenced Congress' amendment of § 1328(a).
The doctrine of federalism is defined as "a proper respect for state
functions. ' ' 304 In practice, this means that in certain situations federal
30°
courts will defer to state courts in matters of importance to the states.
The Supreme Court has defined federalism as
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
300. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34.1(b) (1991) (court may consider alternatives such as community service, diversion centers, and "any other alternative to confinement deemed appropriate by the court"); Harland, supra note 255, at 118.
301. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). "Abstention" refers to the discretionary
decline of federal courts having proper jurisdiction to entertain a controversy in favor of a state
forum. Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. Rav. 530, 531
(1989).
302. 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) ("States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that
should influence a court considering equitable types of relief [i.e., bankruptcy courts].").
303. 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990) (recognizing that discharge of criminal restitutive obligation
may hamper flexibility of state criminal judges).
304. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (describing the notion of "comity"-"perhaps for lack of a
better and clearer way to describe it, [it] is referred to by many as 'Our Federalism' ").
305. Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of FederalCourts,60 N.C. L. Rlv. 59,
61 (1981). Comity also serves as a basis for deciding choice of law issues, such as between
states or between state and federal law. Id. at 61 n.5.
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National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate
30 6
ways.

The "Younger" doctrine, based on the seminal 1971 case,30 7 and cited by
the Supreme Court in the Kelly and Davenport decisions, holds that federal courts should not interfere with pending state criminal proceedings. 30 8 The rationale behind Younger's use of the federalism doctrine
was to avoid disruption of state judicial proceedings. This concern out-

weighs the individual's interest in a federal
forum because federal issues
30 9

can be heard in a pending state action.
In contrast to the hands-off attitude of abstention is the abrogation
of state laws under the doctrine of preemption. Preemption is based on
the Supremacy Clause 310 and arises when federal law conflicts with state
law. Federal law will preempt state law if Congress has expressly or impliedly preempted any state legislation in the area; Congress occupies the
field so as to preclude legislation by the states and to preserve national
uniformity; or any state legislation enacted would be disruptive to the
federal scheme. 31' Preemption thus serves to reject state laws that "in'312
terfere with or are contrary to, the laws of congress.
Federalism and preemption are issues properly raised by the Kelly
and Davenport decisions. Bankruptcy law is exclusively federal and
preempts state court jurisdiction and state-law-based collection actions
over the property of the debtor while she is in bankruptcy. 3 13 Federalism, on the other hand, mandates non-interference with state criminal
proceedings. 31 4 This Section explores the Supreme Court's reasons for
applying the doctrine of federalism to bankruptcy discharges of restitu306. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). A concept closely related to federalism is "comity." Comity has been defined as the relationship
between the state and federal judicial systems; federalism as the relationship between the states
as sovereign entities and the federal government. Friedman, supra note 301, at 536. Thus,
strictly speaking, federal intervention into state court proceedings is governed by "comity";
recognition of state interests in their institutions is federalism. Courts, however, use the terms
interchangeably to denote the federal respect for state government or state courts, and the term
"federalism" will be cited in this Note to refer to a policy of federal deference to state functions
and autonomy.
307. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
308. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47; Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564.
309. Wells, supra note 305, at 70.
310. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
311. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).
312. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)).
313. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
314. Federalism is not constitutionally mandated, although the Supremacy Clause, which
provides that the "Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme law of the land" requires that federal law supersedes and is binding on the states. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.
2.
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tive obligations, and whether bankruptcy law, as exclusively federal,
should preempt further enforcement of the criminal restitutive
obligation.
A.

The Younger Abstention Doctrine

"Our Federalism," the doctrine of abstention defined by the
Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris,3 15 severely limits the injunctive
power of federal courts over state court proceedings. 316 Younger requires
a balancing of state and federal interests to determine whether a federal
court should decline to enjoin state judicial proceedings. 3 17 Although
Younger was applied to a pending criminal proceeding, the Court has
cited important state interests and subsequently extended it to various
other circumstances, including civil proceedings. 3 18 Kelly and Davenport
both reflect the extension of Younger to the civil bankruptcy context and
explicit identification of important state interests: even though no criminal actions were pending in these cases, the bankruptcy courts as courts
of equity were abrogating the sentence of restitution by dishcarging it.
Thus bankruptcy discharge was depriving the states of a valued criminal
sanction.
315. 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
316. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988), limits the power of federal courts
to grant equitable relief. The Bankruptcy Code is excepted from the operation of § 2283 by 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988); hence, only the equitable doctrines of Younger are discussed in this
Note. See In re Davis, 691 F.2d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 1982) (Bankruptcy Code is "expressly
authorized exception" to the Anti-Injunction Act.).
317. Critics of the abstention doctrine believe it violates the mandated separation of powers because it requires federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction given them by Congress.
See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 112 (1984).

318. Originally applied to a criminal proceeding, Younger was actually based on two rationales: I) that courts of equity should not enjoin a criminal prosecution; and 2) "Our Federalism"-that federal courts should avoid interfering with with ongoing state court criminal
proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (federal government in vindicating federal rights
must do so in a way that does not interfere with the "legitimate activities of the states").
However, decisions applying Younger have emphasized the federalism rationale and focused
on the importance of the states' interest in their judicial processes. Hence, Younger has been
extended to civil cases to require federal court abstention if an important state interest can be
identified. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (Younger barred injunctive relief
in parental abuse action because of state interest in child protection); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 338-39 (1977) (Younger applies to civil contempt action because of state interest in its
contempt proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975) (Younger applies to
civil obscenity abatement action because action related to criminal statutes). But see Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (if no state criminal proceeding pending, federal intervention does not contravene policies of Younger).
The most recent case in the civil area is Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
In Pennzoil, Texaco filed suit in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of Pennzoil's $10
billion judgment against it. The Supreme Court ordered the federal court to abstain. Id. at 17.
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The Framers of the Constitution believed that state courts were
more than adequate to protect federal rights.31 9 Thus, the Constitution
does not require, though it permits, the creation of the lower federal
courts. 320 Following the Civil War, Congress granted the federal courts

jurisdiction to hear cases raising issues of federal law. 32 1 This expanded

jurisdiction was in tandem with enactment of civil rights legislation
designed to protect the rights of individuals from state interference. 322
Because of this legislation, the new structure of law that emerged in the
post-Civil War era-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was its centerpiece-clearly established the Federal Government
as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power. 323 Federal
courts now had a
vast range of power which had lain dormant in the Constitution since
1789. These courts ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states and became the primary and powerful
reliances for vindicating every right given
by the Constitution, the
laws, and treaties of the United States. 324
Against this backdrop of expanded federal power, the most enduring national bankruptcy law was enacted in 1898.325
The Younger doctrine thus represents a departure from the spirit of
nationalism which was the impetus behind the 19th century expansion of
federal jurisdiction. Younger requires a balancing of federal and state
interests, but the balance is weighted in favor of the states. 326 In determining whether abstention is appropriate,3 27 federal courts consider
319. "During most of the Nation's first century, Congress relied on the state courts to
vindicate essential rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws." Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967).
320. Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463, 466-67 (1978).
321. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This is the predecessor to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1988).
322. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV; see, eg., Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27;
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Act of
March 1, 1875, Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
323. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
324.

Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER &

JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL

JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928)) (emphasis added by court).

325. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. After repeal of the 1867 Act, "it was apparent that
if the defects of the 1867 Act could be ironed out, a national bankruptcy law became every day
more necessary with the expansion of American commercial activity." Wiecek, supra note 75,
at 357.
326. George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethinking
Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 120 (1990) ("[A] weakness [of Younger] is
that though Younger appears to represent a kind of balancing of federal and state interests, the
nature and weight of the federal interest is not adequately discussed [by the court].").
327. Younger itself provides for exceptions, stating that in "extraordinary circumstances"
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whether exercise of jurisdiction would: (1) slight state courts by questioning their competence or willingness to enforce federal constitutional
rights; (2) interfere with the orderly functioning of state judicial
processes; (3) interfere with substantive state legislation and policies; or
(4) intrude on the discretion of state executive officials and state
32 8
prosecutors.
Bankruptcy discharge of criminal restitution raises the federalism
questions of whether bankruptcy discharge interferes with state criminal
justice systems and whether it undermines the legislative policies behind
restitution statutes. 329 Bankruptcy interferes with state criminal justice
systems because discharging restitutive obligations subverts the effectiveness of criminal sentences. The Court in Kelly identified some other potential problems that discharge of restitution would cause. First,
requiring state probation departments to appear in bankruptcy court or
330
bear the burden of objecting to discharge would be onerous and costly.

Second, the Kelly Court believed that state officials would now have to
331
defend their criminal sanctions before federal bankruptcy judges.
Third, the expectation that restitutive obligations might be discharged
would "hamper the flexibility of state criminal judges in choosing the
combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most likely to further
'' 332
the rehabilitative and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems.
However, these concerns, while valid, are not insurmountable obstacles
preventing the discharge of restitution under certain conditions, as will
be explored in Part VI.
B. Preemption
The Preemption Doctrine mandates that federal law will supplant
state law if state legislation and federal legislation conflict, or if Congress
prohibits analogous state legislation. 333 Based on the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, 3 34 a finding of preemption does not require actual
conflict between state and federal law. Rather, in the absence of express
preemption, the Court looks at whether Congress has so occupied the
federal courts may enjoin state court proceedings. 401 U.S. at 53-54. These exceptions reflect
fact situations where the presumption that state laws are an effective forum to vindicate federal
rights has been overcome: bad faith prosecutions, patently unconstitutional laws, or unavailability of an adequate state forum. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 651-55
(1989).
328. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 320, at 465-66.
329. Because the state courts cannot pass bankruptcy legislation, the question of whether
state courts are unwilling or incompetent does not arise; nor does bankruptcy discharge intrude on executive action.
330. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 48.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 48-49.
333.

JOHN E. NOWAK ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1 (4th ed. 1991).

334.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
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field as to preclude state legislation on the same subject, or whether the
state legislation impermissibly interferes with the effectuation of the interests represented by the federal law. 335 The leading case of bankruptcy

preemption is Perez v. Campbell,336 in which an Arizona motor vehicle

statute allowed a judgment creditor to commence proceedings with the
state licensing board to withhold the debtor's driving privileges until the
debt was paid. 337 Although the bankruptcy court had discharged the
judgment, the creditor subsequently commenced proceedings which resulted in the debtor's license being suspended. 338 The Supreme Court
found that this statute directly conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act's
aims, and that it could not constitutionally withstand the Supremacy
339
Clause because it frustrated the goals of bankruptcy discharge.
Unlike abstention, preemption does not require an analysis of the
legitimacy or importance of the state interest. 34° Although abstention
mandates "sensitivity" to the interests of the states, 341 preemption requires a proper respect for federal law. "The relative importance to the
State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid
335. See, ag., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). When Congress
legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states, the presumption that states' police
powers are not superseded is overcome by demonstrating that "Congress left no room for the
states to supplement" federal regulation; the federal interest predominates such that state enforcement on the same subject is precluded; state and federal policy may be inconsistent; or
state and federal regulations collide. Id. See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 50205 (1956). The Nelson Court noted that
[w]here... Congress has not stated specifically whether a federal statute has occupied a field in which States are otherwise free to legislate, different criteria have provided touchstones for decision. Thus, "this Court, in considering the validity of state
laws in light of... federal laws touching on the same subject, has made use of the
following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconciliability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference.
But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive
constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula."
Id. at 501-02 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (second
omission by court).
336. 402 U.S. 637 (1971). Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) also permits bankruptcy courts to
enjoin pending state-law collection actions unless and until relief from the stay is granted
under § 362(d). 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (d) (1988).
337. 402 U.S. at 641-42.
338. Id. at 641.
339. Id. at 656.
340. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). "[Wjhen Congress 'has
unmistakably ...ordained'. . . that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce,
state laws ... must fall. This result is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly
stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Id. at 525
(quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
341. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 41, 44 (1971).
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Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal
federal law, for the 342
law must prevail."
The Bankruptcy Code illustrates preemption of state insolvency
laws. The fractional nature of state insolvency laws in the nineteenth
century led to the need for a uniform, federal bankruptcy law to preserve
the free flow of commerce between the states.3 43 Congress has plenary
and exclusive power over bankruptcies, and may enact bankruptcy laws
that curtail state court jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 344 The
bankruptcy courts created by Congress have a broad grant of jurisdictional power to hear and decide claims and dispose of the debtor's prop345
As a result, states may not enact legislation that interferes with
erty.
federal bankruptcy laws by requiring debtors to elect between relief in
the bankruptcy court and submission to the jurisdiction of state insolvency laws. 346 The Kelly Court's decision to except criminal restitution
from discharge, therefore, was not mandated by anything other than the
equitable principles of Younger.
Thus, prior to Congress' amendment of § 1328(a), bankruptcy
courts were empowered to discharge criminal restitutive obligations, as
the Court's dischargeability decision in Davenport demonstrates. The
Davenport Court stated "the concerns animating Younger cannot justify
rewriting the Code to avoid federal intrusion. ' 347 Nevertheless, the
Court in Davenport was mindful of the Younger problem, stating: "Nor
do we conclude lightly that Congress intended to interfere with States'
administration of their criminal justice systems. ' 348 Ultimately, however, the Court held restitutive obligations dischargeable, because "[V]e
will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice
34 9
absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.
This was a clear invitation to Congress to act.
Congress accepted the invitation, ignoring the preemption issue.
Evidently, Congress was more concerned with state interests and believed amending § 1328(a) would not disrupt federal law. However, non342. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1981) (quoting Free v.Bland, 369 U.S. 663,
666 (1962)).
343. See supra Part II.A.
344. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940) (Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy and this power encompasses ability to curtail state court
jurisdiction over person and property of debtor); see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Bankruptcy courts have "exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located, of the
debtor as of the commencement of [the] case." 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1988).
345. See supra Part II.A.
346. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929). This is different than the
choice the debtor may have between exempting her property under state law or federal law.
See supra Part II.B.
347. Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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dischargeability of restitution denies the debtor the complete "fresh
start" embodied in the bankruptcy ideal and disrupts the aims of bankruptcy law. Application of the preemption doctrine to the discharge of
criminal restitutive obligations reveals that if the purposes and policies of
the Bankruptcy Code are frustrated by the non-dischargeability of such
debts, then federal bankruptcy law should
preempt state law and such
3 50
obligations should be dischargeable.
Instead of indicating an attempt to mediate between federal and
state interests, Congress' amendment to § 1328(a) shows that Congress
felt state interests in criminal restitution were supreme. Although Congress focused on state interests, the question of whether to discharge
criminal restitutive obligations in bankruptcy implicates the doctrines of
both abstention and preemption. Yet there appears to be an inherent
lack of compatibility between the two doctrines; while the preemption
analysis places federal interests first, abstention mandates that state interests outweigh the federal. Thus, abstention and preemption represent
completely oppositional forces, one of which ultimately has to give way.
Both doctrines should be considered in fashioning discharge exceptions,
however, because the policies behind federal bankruptcy law are equally
important as the state interest in criminal punishment and rehabilitation.
V.

Congress' Amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 1328

In Kelly v. Robinson, the Supreme Court held that criminal restitutive obligations were not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
case.3 5 1 The debtor in Kelly had pleaded guilty to larceny and was sentenced to a prison term. The judge placed her on probation and ordered
that she make restitution to the State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation in the amount of one hundred dollars per month for the five-year
term of her probation. 352 Robinson filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter and listed the restitutive obligation as a debt. The Probation Department failed to file a timely proof of claim, and its claim was thus
disallowed. 353 Robinson was subsequently granted a discharge under
§ 727. 354 When the Probation Department sought to enforce the obligation, Robinson fied a declaratory relief action in the Bankruptcy Court
seeking to establish that the restitutive obligation had been discharged in
350. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) ("As early as Gibbons v. Ogden,
Chief Justice Marshall stated the governing principle-that 'acts of the State Legislatures...
[which] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the
constitution,' are invalid under the Supremacy Clause." (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)) (emphasis added by court) (alteration by court).

351.
352.
353.

479 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1986).
Id. at 38-39.
BANKR. R. 3002(a) (an unsecured creditor must file a proof of claim for the claim to

be allowed).

354. Id. at 39. See supra Part II.C. I for an explanation of the Chapter 7 discharge.
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her bankruptcy and enjoining further enforcement by the Probation Department. 355 The bankruptcy court determined that Robinson's discharge had not affected her restitutive obligations. The district court
affirmed,6 but the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's
35
order.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision, relying
on bankruptcy courts' interpretation of criminal penalties as non-dischargeable debts under the Bankruptcy Code. Mindful of bankruptcy
courts' deference to state criminal actions and the common law interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code that fines and penalties were not affected
by discharge, the Court concluded that Congress could not have intended criminal penalties to be dischargeable as "debts" as defined in
§ 101(4).35 7 Nevertheless, the Court refused to address the question of
whether criminal restitution actually could be considered a debt under
§ 101(4). Instead, the Court held that § 523(a)(7) precluded the discharge of Robinson's restitutive obligations, even though § 523(a)(7)
only addressed itself to "fine[s], penalt[ies], or forfeiture[s]... not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." ' 358 The Court found that even
though restitution, unlike a criminal fine, was compensation for pecuniary loss, the criminal justice system nevertheless operated for the benefit
of society as a whole and not the victim. Citing Younger v. Harris,35 9 the
Court expressed fears that ignoring federalism problems would require
state criminal courts to come into bankruptcy court, and disrupt the ad360
ministration of state criminal justice systems.
In Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport,36 1 the
Supreme Court held that criminal restitutive obligations constituted a
debt under the Bankruptcy Code, 362 and the exception to discharge of
Kelly did not apply in the Chapter 13 context. 363 The debtors in Davenport had pleaded guilty to welfare fraud and were sentenced to one year
probation, with the condition that they make monthly restitutive payments to the probation department. 364 Shortly thereafter, the debtors
filed a petition under Chapter 13 and listed the restitutive obligation as a
355. 479 U.S. at 40.
356. Id. at 42.
357. Id. at 44-47.
358. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988).
359. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
360. 479 U.S. at 47-49.
361. 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
362. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (Supp. 11 1990) defines a "debt" as "liability on a claim"; its
mirror image is § 101(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990), which defines a "claim" as "right to payment."
363. 495 U.S. at 555. Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion in Davenport,had dissented
to the decision in Kelly and prophesied a similar challenge to the non-dischargeability of restitution in a Chapter 13 context. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. at 59, n.6 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
364. 495 U.S. at 556.
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debt on their schedules. When the Davenports failed to make further
payments, the probation department instituted proceedings for violation
of the their probation. The debtors sought to have the probation department retract the violation charges; when the department refused to do so,
the debtors commenced a declaratory relief action seeking discharge of
the restitutive obligation and an injunction prohibiting its further enforcement. 365 The debtors filed and confirmed their Chapter 13 plan, but
the probation department did not fie a proof of claim. When the bankruptcy court discharged the criminal restitutive obligation, the probation
department appealed and was granted a reversal by the district court.
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that Chapter 13 clearly mandated
that restitutive obligations were debts under the Bankruptcy Code and
366
hence dischargeable.
The Davenport Court explicitly focused on whether restitution constituted a debt under the Bankruptcy Code, which the Kelly Court had
failed to do. The Court found that even though "the Probation Department's enforcement mechanism is criminal rather than civil, [it] does not
alter the restitutive order's character as a 'right of payment.' "367 The
Court based its analysis on a comparison between the discharge provisions of Chapters 7 and 13, noting that the broader discharge provisions
of Chapter 13 reflected Congress' belief that it was better for debtors to
pay off their debts.3 68 To construe debt narrowly, the Court reasoned,
"would be to override the balance Congress struck in crafting the appropriate discharge exceptions for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors. ' 369
Unlike the Kelly Court, however, the Davenport Court brushed aside the
federalism dilemma, stating that "the concerns animating Younger cannot justify rewriting the Code to avoid federal intrusion. '370
The Davenport decision generated a flurry of commentary, most of it
expressing dissatisfaction. 37 1 Much of the debate centered on whether
restitution should be considered a debt, because bankruptcy courts prior
to both the Kelly and Davenport decisions had focused exclusively on
whether it could fit within the Code's definition of a debt; bankruptcy
courts have either taken the approach that restitution was a debt, and
365.
366.
367.
368.
for the
369.
370.
371.

Id.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 563. See supra Part II.C.2. The broader discharge of Chapter 13 is a "reward"
effort made to pay off creditors.
495 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 564.
See eg., Katherine A. Francis, Note, Dischargeabilityof CriminalRestitution Obliga-

tions Under Chapter13 of the Bankruptcy Code: Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v.
Davenport, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1349 (1991); Michael J. Donovan, CriminalRestitution and
Bankruptcy Code Discharge-AnotherCasefor Defining the Scope of FederalBankruptcy Law,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 107 (1989).
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thus dischargeable, 372 or that it could not be equated with a debt because
no one was entitled to payment, and hence was non-dischargeable. 373 In
November 1990, Congress clarified its intent by amending the Chapter
13 discharge provisions to except "restitution included in a sentence on

the debtor's conviction of a crime.

'374

The unique nature of restitution as a quasi-debt under the Bankruptcy Code, however, may be better addressed by mediating between

the simple classification of restitution as presumptively dischargeable or
unequivocally non-dischargeable. When restitutive payments are not
made, the offender violates her probation. 375 A probation violation can,
though need not, result in incarceration. Incarceration contravenes both
the "fresh start" envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code and the potentially
rehabilitative effects of restitution. Congress' approach to the problem is
absolute and simplistic; it ignores the policy considerations underlying
restitution and the Bankruptcy Code in favor of a morally and politically
expedient solution. Further, it fails to mediate between the policies of
Younger and the preemeptive effect of bankruptcy law.

VI.

Proposal

Section 1328(a)(3), the Chapter 13 provision mandating the non-dischargeability of criminal restitution, could be rewritten to include language equivalent to the conditional discharge present in the student loan
372. E.g., Multnomah County v. Price (In re Price), 920 F.2d 562, 562 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discharging restitutive obligation in Chapter 13 case without discussion, following holding of
Davenport); Cullens v. District Court (In re Cullens), 77 B.R. 825, 828 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987)
(holding restitutive obligation dischargeable in Chapter 13 case because § 523(a)(7), which was
applicable only to Chapter 7 cases, indicated congressional intent to confine non-dischargeability of restitutive obligation to Chapter 7 cases); In re Vohs, 58 B.R. 323, 326 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1986) (holding restitutive obligation dischargeable in Chapter 13 case where state's
main goal in imposing restitution is to compensate victim).
373. E.g., United States v. O'Connell (In re O'Connell), 80 B.R. 475, 476 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987) (restitution imposed to further penal and rehabilitative goals, not as compensation;
therefore, not a debt dischargeable in Chapter 7 proceeding); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Oslager (In re Oslager), 46 B.R. 58, 61-62 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (restitutive obligation not dischargeable under Chapter 7 because of federalism concerns and fact that restitution
is a criminal sanction, not a debt); Black Hawk County v. Vik (In re Vik), 45 B.R. 64, 67, 69
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (nature of restitution such that its central focus is not payment to
victim, therefore not a debt dischargeable in Chapter 7 proceeding); Pellegrino v. Division of
Crim. Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42 B.R. 129, 134 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (although "debt" as
defined in Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly include restitution, federalism and congressional policy require non-dischargeability in chapter 7 case); In re Button, 8 B.R. 692, 694
(W.D.N.Y. 1981) (restitution imposed as criminal punishment not dischargeable in Chapter 7
proceeding). See also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wright (In re Wright), 87 B.R. 1011, 1016
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1988) (Kelly v. Robinson applies to restitution imposed under federal law).
374. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1990).
375. See supra Part III.B.
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provisions of § 523(a)(8) 376 and the hardship discharge provisions of
§ 1328. 377 A conditional discharge approach shifts the normal presumption in favor of granting relief to the debtor. Instead, the debtor must
demonstrate that the particular debt merits discharge by identifying
those circumstances which characterize her as an "honest" debtor or one
who has made "good faith" efforts. In considering whether to grant a
discharge of the restitutive obligation, the bankruptcy court should
weigh the debtor's circumstances and consider prior payments under the
plan, ability to make further payments under the plan, and whether the
debtor has included the restitutive obligation in the plan or made any
prior payments on it. Consideration of these factors will reveal whether
the debtor warrants a discharge of the restitutive obligation because discharging the obligation will foster the policies of bankruptcy without
harming the goals of criminal restitution, and will prevent corruption of
the bankruptcy process by those debtors not deserving discharge of the
restitutive obligation.
The policy differences reflected in the different discharge provisions
applicable to Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy cases support the use of a
conditional discharge for criminal restitutive obligations in Chapter 13
cases. The Chapter 7 debtor who does not make repayment to creditors
under a plan, but instead offers his non-exempt assets for liquidation,
does not merit the same inquiry into hardship, good faith, and best efforts that are made when determining whether to grant a "hardship discharge" under Chapter 13. The Supreme Court in Davenport recognized
that the broader discharge given Chapter 13 debtors represented Congress' recognition and reward of the debtor's repayment efforts. Based
on this, the Davenport court discharged the criminal restitutive obligation. However, a presumption of dischargeability of criminal restitution
does not accommodate the states' interest in their criminal processes, as
Congress recognized when amending § 1328(a). Yet a bright-line dischargeability rule does not accommodate the debtor's interest in rehabilitation, particularly under a Chapter 13 repayment plan. The conditional
approach synthesizes the concerns of both extremes by allowing a discharge if the debtor's circumstances merit it, but barring discharge in the
absence of such circumstances.
The Bankruptcy Code already contains several policing provisions-conditional approaches to discharge-which reflect concerns that
the bankruptcy process not be abused. The "substantial abuse" doctrine
used to weed out unmeritorious Chapter 7 cases 378 and the "good faith"
and "best efforts" tests used to monitor Chapter 13 plans 379 are exam376.
377.
378.

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.

379.

See supra notes 183, 223.
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ples, as well as the various discharge exceptions in §§ 523 and 1328380
that contain some conditional or limiting language, including the educational loan provisions. 381 These provisions, which require the court to
consider more equitable factors, are in tune with the bankruptcy policy
of granting relief to "honest" debtors, but at the same time ensure that
the debtor who does not make good faith efforts under their Chapter 13
plan, refuses to cooperate with the bankruptcy process, or has incurred
debts that policy dictates must be paid, does not obtain a discharge. The
somewhat less honest debtor with a criminal record who owes restitution
need not be denied the full fresh start afforded by bankruptcy because of
past criminal conduct. Although the presence of such past criminal conduct requires that the presumption in favor of discharge be abandoned,
resort to an absolute non-dischargeability rule is not necessary; instead, a
conditional approach can be used. This conditional approach to the discharge of criminal restitution would conform to the spirit of the Code's
other policing provisions.
Restitution, however, is distinguishable from educational loans and
other dischargeable debts: restitution is not a purely civil obligation, but
also a criminal sanction. While bankruptcy rehabilitates by discharging
debts, criminal law rehabilitates by imposing a monetary obligation, restitution. Discharge of restitution on the surface would appear to be contrary to the rehabilitative goals of state criminal laws. However,
bankruptcy discharge imposes its cost on the debtor in two ways: First,
the debtor has already paid, through interest charges, for the benefits of
discharge, and second, the debtor will forfeit property or income in the
administration of her bankruptcy estate. Although the debtor who owes
criminal restitution has not paid for the costs of discharge in the form of
pre-bankruptcy interest, in a Chapter 13 case the debtor will pay the debt
with future income. Thus, even under a conditional discharge approach,
the debtor cannot escape "paying" for her crime.
Specifically, section 1328(a)(3) could be modelled after the educational loan provisions of § 523(a)(8), for example. Applying a time limitation like that of § 523(a)(8)(A) complements the restitution statutes'
prohibition on imposing long-term obligations or the continued enforcement of aged obligations. Crafting an "undue hardship" exception like
that of § 523(a)(8)(B) conforms to the hardship exceptions in many restitution statutes that substitute other forms of duties, such as community
service, when the offender cannot in good faith continue to make payments. This conditional approach would not upset the rehabilitative
goals of restitution. If the debtor has already made some payments and
is currently in a situation where further payment has become impossible,
granting discharge of the obligation will preserve the aims of both bank380. See supra notes 205-216, 190-197 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 226-236 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy and restitution. Because the debtor will risk incarceration if restitution is not paid, the potentially rehabilitative effects of restitution and
bankruptcy through retained liberty and renewed economic participation
382
will be lost.
Changing § 1328(a)(3) to reflect a conditional approach would preserve supremacy of bankruptcy laws on a national level. This would not
offend "Our Federalism" because bankruptcy courts will consider factors
of importance to the states in determining whether discharge should be
granted or not. These factors include the same factors the criminal court
considered in deciding whether to impose the restitution sentence in the
first place, such as the nature of the crime, damage to the victim, and
ability to pay. State criminal courts will not be disinclined to impose
restitution as a punishment because it will not be discharged by those
debtors who do not deserve the benefits of discharge. More specifically,
as the Kelly Court noted, the potential dischargeability of restitution
might deter criminal courts from imposing restitution and burden criminal justice systems with the filing of objections to the dischargeability of
such an obligation. This concern reflects the deference to state interests
behind "Our Federalism." These burdens and potential interference
with state interests can be addressed on two levels. First, the burden
could be placed on the debtor to establish the "hardship" and good faith
efforts meriting the discharge, as in section 523(a)(8). Allowing the
trustee to object to the dischargeability of restitution could lessen the
state's procedural burden. The inquiry of "hardship" could be focused
on the state's interest in preserving the obligation by substituting community service or other duties on the part of the debtor to further the
state's rehabilitative and punitive goals. Second, accommodation and
recognition of state interests in this manner will not subvert the principles of "Our Federalism"; rather, preserving some chance of discharge
for certain meritorious debtors will retain the supremacy of bankruptcy
laws on the federal level.
A conditional approach would prevent the bankruptcy courts from
becoming a haven for criminals. In order to preserve the rehabilitative
effects of criminal restitution, the discharge must be more costly-obstacles to discharge must be left in place. This can be achieved through a
conditional approach rather than the absolute approach adopted by Congress. With a conditional approach, avenues to discharge can be left
open through the use of hardship exceptions. Under these exceptions
bankruptcy courts can also examine the possibility of state-level substitutes such as community service and thereby ensure that the rehabilita382. Like bankruptcy, restitution also provides a "fresh start" of its own. See Huggett v.
State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1978) ("One who successfully makes restitution should have a positive sense of having earned a fresh start and will have tangible evidence
of his or her capacity to alter old behavior patterns . .

").
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tive goals of criminal restitution are still served. In this way, Congress
could prevent debtors who owe criminal restitution from using the bankruptcy laws as "a shield to protect [themselves] from punishment for
'383
[their] crime.
VII.

Conclusion

Current bankruptcy law represents an evolutionary step away from
debtor's prisons as the fresh start policy removes the stigma of insolvency. As a practical matter, courts cannot avoid the collision of bankruptcy laws and state court criminal penalties. Thus, we should seek to
accommodate both with minimal disruptions, mindful of the Supreme
Court's federalism concerns as expressed in Younger and the purpose of
bankruptcy discharge.
The Supreme Court correctly interpreted the application of civil
penalties in the criminal context as a debt, and consistent with the Bankruptcy Code discharged such obligation. The inquiry as demonstrated
above does not end there. In order to avoid a result after bankruptcy at
the state court level that is inconsistent with the fresh start philosophy of
bankruptcy and the purposes for which restitution is used, use of the
Bankruptcy Code in a more flexible fashion is desirable.
Discharge of criminal restitution need not be inconsistent with
either the goals of state criminal law or federal bankruptcy law. A conditional approach would mediate between the requirements of both by preserving the safety net of discharge for those debtors who can demonstrate
circumstances sufficient to merit its benefits, but denying it to those who
would attempt to abuse bankruptcy by avoiding their restitution obligations in bad faith.
Modelling the discharge provisions of restitution after educational
loans, which eschew a bright line approach to dischargeability, is a more
effective method of accommodating both state and federal interests. By
mediating between state and federal interests, the "conditional" discharge approach avoids favoring state interests at the expense of federal
aims and abrogating criminal statutes for the benefit of national economic goals. The fresh start and rehabilitative goals of both federal and
state law can be served without sacrificing either to the other.

383. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

